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INTRODUCTION

An important issue presented in the expanding engagement by college and
university faculty members in collective bargaining has been the status of
nonrenewal of appointment, denial of tenure or promotion, or the imposition
of discipline under the grievance arbitration procedure of the collective
agreement. Some observers simply see no place for the "intrusion" of an
t
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off-campus judgment into the institution's internal decisional processes'
Some see no reason for disallowing review of the merits of such decisions; 2
others have struggled with establishing a system whereby arbitration corrects
only procedurally deficient decisions, eschewing review of the merits.8
This Article outlines the differences between industrial assumptions and
decisional processes in institutions of higher education and surveys the
alternatives accommodating the grievance arbitration procedure to those
processes. The Article also explores how arbitrators have dealt in practice
with faculty status grievances under a variety of these approaches. 4 Tentative assessments of the awards are made and some suggestions are offered
for accommodating arbitration to higher education.

II.
A.

ANATOMY OF THE PROBLEM

InstitutionalAssumptions

The "industrial model" is built on the assumption of management's right to
make decisions and the bargaining agent's right to seek to subject them to the
limitations or rules of the collective agreement. 5 Disputes arising under the
Gorman for their comments on different earlier drafts; errors and misperceptions are
entirely the author's.
1.

R.

CARR & D.

VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS 224-

25 (1973); H. Levy, Academic Judgment and Grievance Arbitration in Higher Education, Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, Special Report No. 20, at 8
(April 1975) ("A final decision on substantive matters arrived at by an individual
arbitrator who is outside the [decisional] process appears at least, to undermine the
principle of democratic self-governance and may be injurious to the institution's capacity
for achieving public expectations.").
2. See, e.g., Morand & Purcell, Grievance and Arbitration Processing, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAw 297, 315 (J. Vladeck &

S. Vladeck eds. 1975) ("[tlhe mysticism of the 'academic judgment' line of argument
has established in higher education one of the last bastions of unaccountable management authority").
3. Summarized in Benewitz, Contract Provisions and Procedures,in J. Vladeck & S.
Vladeck, supra note 2, at 275, and H. Levy, supra note 1; Ferguson & Bergan, GrievanceArbitration Procedures and Contract Administration, 1 J. COLLEGE & U. LAw 371
(1974).
4. Most arbitration awards are unpublished and there is no single source which
routinely publishes all awards in higher education. Accordingly, rather full accounts of
the facts and reasoning will have to be supplied. The author has relied primarily on the
American Arbitration Association's Arbitration in the Schools, through which noted
awards are made available. The author would like to express his appreciation to Steven
Vladeck, Esq., and to the United Federation of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFT,
AFL-CIO, for making available awards in then Unit II (non-tenure eligible) of the City
University of New York (CUNY), and to Woodley B. Osborne, Esq., of the American
Association of University Professors, for making various awards under AAUP contracts
available. Other attorneys and arbitrators have also been most kind in supplying awards
in individual cases not noted in the AAA service. While this review is by no means
comprehensive, the author believes it to be sufficiently representative for analytical
purposes. [Editor's Note: Subsequent to the submission of this manuscript Professor June
Weisberger's monograph appeared. J. Weisberger, Faculty Grievance Arbitration in
Higher Education: Living with Collective Bargaining (Institute of Public Employment,
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Monograph No. 5, Jan. 1976).
The monograph deals primarily with the City University of New York (CUNY) and
the State University of New York (SUNY). Where possible her observations have been
noted. Fortunately, most of the CUNY awards she discusses also are discussed here.]
5. The "industrial model" is posited for analytical purposes since, as David Feller
has pointed out, a counter structure of employee imposed work rules also has strong
historical roots. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALn. L. REv. 663, 724-25 (1973).
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agreement are, in the vast majority of cases, submitted to arbitration, which
supplies a device for policing the agreement's terms as well as for solving
unresolved or unforeseen problems in that context. For example, decisions
to hire, assign, promote, reward, or discipline are viewed archetypically as
the province of management, although the collective agreement may subject
those decisions to agreed-upon limitations. In an arbitration proceeding the
threshold question is whether the collective agreement has in fact limited
management's right to decide and, if so, to what extent.
This model stands in sharp contrast to the assumptions upon which faculty
status decisions usually are made in higher education. In most institutions
the responsibility for both the practical decisional standards and the initial
decisions themselves lies primarily with the academic disciplinary or peer
group. While the general criteria upon which the individual will be assessed may be established by institutional policy,6 their application is tailored
to the individual candidate and may be the result of a different weighting of
each criterion by each of the faculty participants; the evaluation process
may contemplate comparison with other candidates or with the available
pool in the academic labor market. The recommendations of the disciplinary group are subject to administrative and, not infrequently, additional
faculty review before final acceptance or rejection. That review assesses
how well the department or school can support its recommendation and
weighs that recommendation against the overall needs of the institution and
the competing claims by other schools and departments.
The justification for this system of faculty participation is found in the
purposes of the institution-primarily the acquisition, testing, and transmission of knowledge by specialized professionals. The professional status of
the principals and their proximity to the day-to-day functioning of the
institution yields a high degree of expertise which is brought to bear in
faculty status decisions. In addition, peer participation, essentially a process
of certification by the professional group, lends legitimacy to the decision and
supplies a buffer against the intrusion of aprofessional considerations, e.g., a
negative judgment by an administrator or trustee in response to unconventional or unpopular expressions of the candidate. 7 In contrast to the
6. These criteria include, for example, completion of advanced study or the
acquisition of professional experience, evidence of scholarship, classroom effectiveness,
relevance of one's specialization to the current and projected needs of the program, and
institutional or community service.
7. The founding statement on academic freedom in American higher education
observed:
A university is a great and indispensable organ of the higher life of a civilized community, in the work of which the trustees hold an essential and
highly honorable place, but in which the faculties hold an independent
place, with quite equal responsibilities-and in relation to purely scientific
and educational questions, the primary responsibility.
it' is . . . inadmissible that the power of determining when departures
from the requirements of the scientific spirit and method have occurred,
should be vested in bodies not composed of members of the academic profession. Such bodies necessarily lack full competency to judge of those
requirements; their intervention can never be exempt from the suspicion
that it is dictated by other motives than zeal for the integrity of science;
and it is, in any case, unsuitable to the dignity of a great profession that
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assumptions governing blue collar industrial employment, the system of
structured professional influence in faculty status decisions in higher education assumes first that management's practical authority to decide is shared
with the faculty s and second that the correctness of the judgment rests
largely on subjective assessments.9
The system of highly influential but technically non-binding professional
judgments on faculty status does not entirely obviate the possibility of error
or abuse either by the peer group itself or by the administration. In some
institutions an internal institutional grievance procedure wholly apart from
collective bargaining has been established. This procedure is usually controlled by the faculty but occasionally consists of both faculty and administration. 10 The grievance committee's review customarily is reserved to determining whether the grievant was given adequate or fair consideration and
not whether it would agree or disagree with the result on the merits."
Similarly, the imposition of discipline is customarily determined by the
the initial responsibility for the maintenance of its professional standards
should not be in the hands of its own members.
The 1915 Declaration of Principles, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 155, 163, 169
(L. Joughin ed. 1969).
8. Note, for example, one arbitrator's reasoning when confronted by an administration's argument denying responsibility for a negative decision generated by the faculty:
Having adopted the format of unionism, college faculty members still
may have much to learn from the prototypes of their relatively new-found
type of organization. This dispute would seem utterly unreal to many
trade unionists, for they would be loath to place themselves in the position
of self-censure which their academic counterparts appear to have assumed
with reference to their colleagues in their own union! In the final analysis though, a 'management,' or whatever it may be called, cannot avoid its
intrinsic responsibilities. The final responsibility for hiring and firing, for
retention and for non-retention, remains in the administration, and it cannot 'cop out,' as the saying goes, by contending that it turned this function
over to 'the employees.'
Board of Junior College Dist. 508, 53 Lab. Arb. 530, 536 (1969) (Sembower, Arbitrator). There is an industrial analogy to the contrary when joint union-management
participation in apprenticeship decisions substitutes for arbitration on the merits. See
West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 35 (1964) (Abersold, Arbitrator). See also
Gore Newspapers Co., 63 Lab. Arb. 538 (1974) (Turkus, Arbitrator); Aiken Indus.,
Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 649 (1972) (Cole, Arbitrator).
9. Outside of higher education arbitrators have encountered similar difficulties
when confronting decisions based on subjective assessments such as the musical judgment
of a conductor in dismissing a member of a symphony orchestra, M. Moscow, LAI)OR
RELATIONS IN THE PERFORMING ARTS 130 (1969), or the dismissal of a broadcast
newsman on grounds of incompetence, Coulson, What Has To Be Arbitrated in Broadcasting, in BROADCASTING AND BARGAINING 85, 88 (A. Koenig ed. 1970). The complica-

tion added in higher education concerns the role of the faculty in generating the decision.
10. For a useful discussion see McConnell, The Fractious Academy: A Canadian
Approach to Dispute Resolution, 3 J. LAW & EDuc. 233 (1974).

11. As a former chairman of such a committee in the University of California
system explains:
Similarly, in cases where tenure is denied, the committee would refuse
to hear the case if the issue were put strictly in terms of academic judgment. If the department voted 5-4 against, but the evidence was such that
another department might have voted 5-4 in favor, then presumably the
vote could have been anything from 9-0 all the way to 0-9. If all a complaint involves is the allegation that the evidence could or even should
have supported a different conclusion, there is no reason for the committee
to become involved: why should it be thought more reliable in its judgment of academic matters than any other campus agency? Again, we
would not take up the complaint unless the complainant could throw doubt
on the fairness of the proceedings, and give us a good reason to suspect
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governing board of the institution only after a hearing before a faculty
committee.
The recommendations of both grievance and hearing committees, however, are usually advisory. Whether the administration and governing
board will concur in a hotly contested case is essentially a political matter to
be determined by weighing the degree of prestige of the principals involved,
the depth and extent of faculty sentiment, the probability of loss of leading
faculty occasioned by the governing board's refusal to accept the faculty's
position, the impact of negative publicity on the institution, the sentiment in
other relevant constituencies of the institution such as students, alumni, and
legislators, and, not inconceivably, the cogency of the faculty committee's
reasoning. Arbitration presents itself as an alternative not to wholly unfet2
tered managerial discretion, but to ad hoc institutional political activity.1
B.

The Dilemma of ArbitralStandards

Whether it is necessary for a forum to be supplied for the adjudication of
faculty status disputes must be determined first; that is, why such matters are
not best dealt with through the internal processes just discussed. For a
number of institutions, largely the better universities and leading liberal arts
colleges, internal political suasion may well continue to prove satisfactory to
remedy strongly challenged faculty status decisions.' 3 However, the rather
sudden shift in the academic labor market may have lessened the potential
impact of such traditional internal devices in many institutions. Indeed, the
movement toward collective bargaining often reflects anxiety at the lack of
administrative responsiveness to faculty judgments. This situation is exacerbated in state institutions by the growing tendency toward statewide centralization and coordination which further removes the locus of decision-making
that more had been involved than the mere exercise of professional judgment on the complainant's record.

Ellis, Grievance Procedures: Real and Ideal, in
NEL PRACTICES 63, 70 (R. Peairs ed. 1974).

AVOIDING CONFLICT IN FACULTY PERSON-

12. Note the conclusion of a recent study: "In essence, the bureaucratic mechanisms
of contract administration and the channeling and resolution of conflict they provide
help regularize the political dynamics that occur in unionization and collective bargain-

ing." F. KEMERER & J. BALDRIDGE, UNIONS ON CAMPUS 4 (1975). Professor Baldridge
had earlier refined a "political" analysis of academic decision-making in his study of
New York University. J.

BALDRIDGE, POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY

(1971).

13. The comments of the Stanford University Chapter of the American Association
of University Professors in proposing an internal grievance procedure for that institution
noted:
[A]s a practical matter, the [grievance] Panel will have the power to insure that its recommendations are taken seriously and that they will carry
substantial weight with the administrative officers to whom they are made.
At the same time, the proposed Faculty Grievance Procedure preserves to

the administrative officers of the University necessary flexibility by not
forcing them to adopt the Panel's recommendations in every case. Obviously refusal to follow or to be influenced by the recommendations of the
Faculty Grievance Panel could not be carried to excess without destroying
the harmony with the faculty that the University administration has
sought and will no doubt continue to seek. At a University such as
Stanford, there is every reason to believe that the recommendations of the
faculty groups empowered to review faculty grievances will have substantial influence.
Stanford University, Campus Report, vol. 6, no. 35, at 11 (May 29, 1974).
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from faculty influence. 1 4 Thus, the binding nature of the arbitral disposition is of significance to increasingly insecure faculty members.
An alternative to arbitration is judicial review. Outside the context of
collective bargaining, disgruntled faculty are resorting increasingly to the
courts to challenge faculty status decisions on constitutional,' 5 contractual,'0
or statutory grounds. 17 Not surprisingly, the sporadic engagement of the
judiciary has produced highly variegated case law.' 8 Given this state of
affairs, arbitration has a greater potential than the courts for producing
decisions responsive to the needs of the institution, for the decisional
standards are fashioned jointly by representatives of the administration and
faculty, and they jointly select the decision-maker, presumably because of his
special competence.' 9 Moreover, arbitration is still relatively swifter and
less expensive than a lawsuit. Thus, a successful arbitration system will to
the extent labor boards or the judiciary defer to its decisions foster rather
than intrude on institutional autonomy.
The requirements of such an arbitration system, however, are highly
problematic. First, the operational role of the faculty in generating the
decisions challenged must be accommodated. As one guidebook for faculty
bargaining points out:
The difficulty is that decisions which may become the subject of
grievances are made, at least initially, by the faculty-frequently
pursuant to the contract itself. The availability of a contractual
grievance procedure and ultimately, arbitration, not only limits peer
discretion as well as administrative discretion, but it may place the
bargaining agent in the uncomfortable
position of pursuing grievances
20
against its own members.
Second, and closely related, the highly subjective character of the challenged
decision places an enormous stress on arbitral standards and on the arbitrators themselves.
Some collective agreements accordingly eschew arbitration altogether to
resolve these kinds of disputes. For example, the collective agreement at
14. R. CARR & D. VAN EYCK, supra note 1; A. THOMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
(1974); Finkin, Book Review, 123 U.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
PA. L. REV. 217 (1974).

15. In the public sector the law is clear that professors cannot be terminated for

reasons violative of constitutional rights. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
16. In the private sector, where institutions are not subject to constitutional limitations, most of the recent litigation has been based on contract theory.
17. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. III, 1973).
18. Compare Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974), with Johnson
v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (application of title VII

to faculty status decisions); compare Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d

843 (D.C. Cir. 1975), with Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974) (the
role of professional norms in the interpretation of institutional obligations); compare

Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973), with Rehor v. Case Western
Reserve Univ., 72 Ohio Op. 2d 23, 331 N.E.2d 416, 43 Ohio St. 2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(whether a professor modifies his tenure by accepting an annual renewal). See
generally Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 575 (1973).

19. See Arbitration of Faculty Grievances, 59 AAUP BULL. 168 (1973).
20. M.

FINKIN,

R.

GOLDSTEIN

&

W.

OSBORNE,

GAINING FOR COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY FACULTY

A

82 (1975).

PRIMER ON COLLECTIVE BAR-
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Rutgers University merely creates a joint administration-faculty review
committee whose report is advisory to the president. 21 This in essence
reserves the resolution of disputes to the internal political processes of the
institution, a satisfactory approach when the faculty has confidence in the
integrity of those processes. At the other end of the spectrum a faculty may
simply adopt the "industrial model." For example, the collective agreement
for the faculty of Roger Williams College (R.I.) requires "just cause" for
any faculty termination, both tenured and non-tenured, subject to arbitral
review under that standard. 2 2 Agreements in other institutions permit
review of the merits, but under a standard of whether the action was
23
arbitrary or capricious.
The leading approach to collective agreements contemplates arbitral review of whether faculty status decisions were arrived at in accord with
procedures found either in the agreement itself or in institutional regulations,
policies, and practices. Adoption of this approach creates a dichotomy
between arbitrable procedural error and non-arbitrable substantive decisions.
Indeed, a number of agreements make it quite explicit that the arbitrator is
not to reach the "merits" of such decisions or to substitute his judgment for
24
the "academic judgment" involved.
The initial collective agreement in the City University of New York
(CUNY) system are paradigmatic. 25 They provided, inter alia, for the
maintenance of the rights of all faculty bodies established by university
bylaws or by the agreement, and for the establishment of standing arbitration
panels composed of persons, serving on a rotating basis, "familiar with the
A
customs, practices, nature and spirit of the academic community."
grievance was defined as breach or misapplication of the agreement, or
arbitrary application of or a failure to act pursuant to the bylaws and policies
of the governing board relating to terms and conditions of employment. This
definition was subject, however, to a Nota Bene providing that grievances
relating to appointment, reappointment, promotion, or tenure "which are
concerned with academic judgment" may not be arbitrated. An allegation
of arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedure may be arbitrated subject to a
limitation that:
21. Agreement between Rutgers, the State Univ., and the Rutgers Council, AAUP,
art. VIII (May 15, 1973 as amended, July 18, 1974).

22. Agreement between Bd. of Trustees, Roger Williams College, and Roger Williams College Faculty Ass'n (RIEA/NEA), arts. IX, X (1973-74).
23. Agreement between the State Bd. of Regents and the Univ. of Rhode Island
AAUP, art. XV (Nov. 6, 1972); Agreement between the Adm'n of Pratt Institute and
the United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFT (AFL-CIO), art. XVI (Sept.
1972).
24. Benewitz, A Proposal for Improving College Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 43, 44

(1974); Ferguson & Bergan, supra note 3, at 377-78; Finkin, Grievance Procedures, in

66 (E. Duryea & R. Fisk eds. 1973).
25. The initial agreements containing substantially the same language were negotiated for separate units of tenure-eligible and non-tenure-eligible professional staff represented by different unions. Agreement between the Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of
New York and the Legislative Conference, art. VI (Sept. 15, 1969); Agreement between
the Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of New York and the United Fed'n of College
Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO, art. VI (Oct. 3, 1969). Both the units and the union
were later consolidated.
FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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In such case the power of the arbitrator shall be limited to remanding
the matter for compliance with established procedures. It shall be the
arbitrator's first responsibility to rule as to whether or not the grievance
relates to procedure rather than academic judgment. In no event,
however, shall the arbitrator substitute his judgment for the academic
the event that the grievant finally prevails, he shall be
judgment. In
26
made whole.
The intent of this and similar provisions in other agreements is clear: to
insure adherence to internal faculty-administration processes while preventing the intrusion of an external, non-academic judgment into the substance of
academic decisions. The intent is indistinguishable from the common
faculty grievance procedure adopted outside collective bargaining. Accordingly, the discussion must turn to how well that end has been served in
comparison with allowing review of the merits of challenged decisions.
III.
A.

TnE ARBITRAL EXPERIENCE

Arbitrability: The Proscription on Reaching the Merits of Academic
Decisions

When a faculty status decision is challenged upon a failure to adhere to
procedural requirements, the issues presented are the seriousness of the
procedural departure and the remedy to be afforded. Nevertheless, the
presence of an "academic judgment" exemption or other prohibition on
reaching the merits of a faculty status decision has not hindered the
presentation of a grievance for arbitration touching on the merits, albeit in
the guise of a procedural challenge. Grievants have argued that no valid
academic judgment was made since the criteria employed or the considerations taken into account were not permissible. In addition, grievants have
alleged that the judgment itself fell afoul of some other explicit contractual
provision, such as a prohibition on discrimination due to union activity,
which the arbitrator has jurisdiction to apply.
(1) Defining an Exempted "Academic Judgment."
When, as in CUNY, an "academic judgment" is exempted from arbitration, the arbitrator will be called on to decide what constitutes such a
judgment. One arbitrator held, for example, that a college-wide faculty
personnel committee may properly fail to concur with a favorable departmental renewal recommendation for reasons having nothing to do with the
candidate's qualifications, but solely on the basis of a projected need to
consolidate institutional offerings in several departments. 27 Equally, it was
held an exercise of academic judgment for a department to allocate part-time
26. Id. The history of negotiations on the arbitration provision and a critique of
early awards is supplied in Mintz & Golden, In Defense of Academic Judgment: Settling
Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement Grievances Through Arbitration, 22 BuFFALO

L. REV. 523 (1973). See also J. Weisberger, supra note 4, at 13.
27. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. United Fed'n of College
Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO, AAA Case No. 1339-0360-72 (April 9, 1973) (Rubin,
Arbitrator).
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teaching funds to deserving graduate students rather than to part-time
28
lecturers.
While these conclusions are sound, it is important to note that the
arbitrator had to consider the justification for these decisions in order to
ascertain whether they were within the ambit of the faculty's and administration's discretion. The latter award makes clear that the arbitrator personally
approved of the department's choice on the merits. 29 Thus, where the
validity of the criteria employed in making an "academic judgment" is
challenged, the exemption of a decision on the merits from the scope of
arbitration does not entirely foreclose review of the factors involved in the
decision; an arbitral determination that an invalid judgment was made may
potentially be based upon an arbitrator's disagreement with the considerations the faculty and administration brought to bear.
A different approach is reflected in two awards which deal with academic
judgment in terms of the respective roles of the campus president, the
university chancellor, and the governing board in decisions on the award of
tenure. In October 1970 the chancellor of CUNY issued a statement to the
campus presidents that more selective procedures were required for the
award of tenure. The chancellor asked that new faculty have a fifty percent
chance of acquiring tenure and that no department have more than threefourths of its full-time faculty tenured. After vigorous objection by the
bargaining agent for the full-time faculty that tenure "quotas" were being
imposed, the chancellor issued a clarifying statement to the effect that his
previous urgings were only "broad guidelines." He stressed the significance
of tenure decisions, the responsibility of the presidents for the well-being of
their institutions, and urged prudence "in making decisions that would result
in too large a proportion of the faculty having tenure status."
A professor at Queensborough Community College was notified in early
November 1970 that the faculty personnel and budget committee had
recommended him for tenure, subject to approval by the governing board.
The committee, although aware of the chancellor's guidelines, had recommended a number for tenure beyond the percentage urged and the president
concurred in their recommendations. After meeting with the governing
board's CUNY committee (in effect its executive committee), the campus
president was directed to reduce the number of professors recommended for
tenure. Accordingly, he returned the matter to the college personnel
committee which refused to revise its recommendations. The president then
reviewed the files for each of the candidates himself and reversed the
affirmative recommendation of the faculty committee in eleven cases. A
test case was brought by the professor on behalf of all those adversely
affected. The arbitrator posed the issue as whether the president's removal
of some names from the recommended list was unreviewable "academic
judgment":
28. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. Local 1460, UFCT, AAA
Case No. 1339-0077-72 (Jan. 13, 1973) (Wildebush, Arbitrator).
29. "This Departmental decision was not arbitrary. It was in the best interests of
the College, and also in the national interest." Id. at 10.
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'Academic judgment' is a professional judgment employing such relevant criteria as the judgers see fit to employ, including but not limited
to those which may be mandated by the collective bargaining Agreement and in the rules, policies and Bylaws of the Board. Subjective
and intangible considerations must play a part in evaluations that
comprise academic judgment. Assessments by secret-ballot votes of
P&B's [Personnel and Budget Committees] and by Presidents embrace
many factors based on materials in the files as well as personal
knowledge. 30
The arbitrator concluded that a second look at the tenure recommendation
by the president on his own initiative would not constitute an arbitrary or
discriminatory use of procedure. On the other hand, he found the actions
of the chancellor and the CUNY committee improper since they had in fact
compelled the president to revise his recommendation. He concluded that
although the president used "academic judgment" in weeding eleven names
from the original list, the decision to eliminate them was not an "academic
judgment."
In a companion case arising in a sister community college the same
arbitrator concluded that the president had voluntarily accepted the chancellor's guidelines in deciding initially not to accept the recommendation of his
college's personnel and budget committee.
Since Presidents are charged with responsibility for tenure recommendations under the Board's Bylaws, those standards and guidelines which
the Presidents deem appropriate may be utilized in the exercise of their
academic judgment. This is quite different from circumstances in
which the academic judgment of a President might be improperly
overridden by a higher authority, and his recommendations then would
not be the result of the President's own judgment. Only if a President
were compelled to change his judgment to meet conditions promulgated
by others, to defer to the judgment of someone else against his own
inclinations, could it be said that arbitrary or discriminatory procedures
were involved.8 1
The arbitrator pointed out that the same guidelines urged by the chancellor
may well be accepted and taken into account by the faculty, and the
"voluntary adoption of such a concept to attain a certain level of tenured
faculty could not be held violative of the Agreement." Moreover, if the
president's decision is "the product of his review and reflection on the
qualities of various candidates, in the light of the needs of the institution, the
fact that some one else might have come to a totally different conclusion or
even a 'better' one-is immaterial. 8' 2 Thus, he observed that the personnel
and budget committee's unanimous recommendation of the grievants does
not limit the president's "academic judgment."
The arbitrator in these two cases adopts an operational definition of
"academic judgment": an academic judgment is one made by an academic.
The result, however, is made to turn on the state of mind of those exercising
30. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. Legislative Conference, AAA
Case No. 1330-0090-71, at 18-19 (Jan. 25, 1972) (Friedman, Arbitrator).
31. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. Legislative Conference, AAA
Case Nos. 1339-0167-71, 1339-0169-71, at 6 (Jan. 25, 1972) (Friedman, Arbitrator).
32. Id. at 11.

1976]

FACULTY STATUS ARBITRATION

such judgment. When the president "voluntarily" accepts the guidelines he
is exercising academic judgment; when he "feels coerced" a remedy is
afforded.
These two awards concern a significant problem of academic government.
If the governing board chooses to "up-grade" standards for the award of
tenure, new standards binding on the college faculties and administrations
may be promulgated, or an intense review of each individual recommended
for the award of tenure may be initiated according to what the board
conceives to be desirable standards. The former approach might require the
board to deal either with the university faculty senate or the collective
bargaining agent, or both, in the establishment of new policy. An intense
review is unworkable, for the board lacks both the time and expertise
necessary to review the hundreds of recommendations generated in so large a
system. Negative actions would occasion considerable friction with local
campus faculties and administrations, and the grievance procedure would
become over-burdened. Thus, the CUNY board apparently chose a middle
ground: on the one hand, the board moved toward revision of policy without
officially adopting it; on the other, the board pressed to have the new policy
accepted at the campus level. From this perspective the arbitrator's reliance
on the campus president's "state of mind" is irrelevant to the larger issue of
academic government actually posed in the two cases.
The fair import of this brief review is that an "academic judgment" is an
independent judgment made by academics on the basis of academically
cognizable criteria. The arbitral role is, by this definition, restricted to
determining whether academics exercised an uncoerced discretion solely on
the basis of considerations customarily employed in the institution or normally taken account of in the academic community. This seeming restriction,
then, presents a palpable invitation to arbitrate.
(2)

Resolving Conflicts with Other Provisions.

A proscription on reaching the merits may conflict with provisions prohibiting employment discrimination, guaranteeing academic freedom, or otherwise governing faculty status decisions found either in the collective agreement or in institutional policies and practices incorporated by reference.
(a) Non-discrimination. When a prospective appointee at Queens
College of the City University alleged that the institution's refusal to appoint
was for reasons violative of the non-discrimination clause of the contract, the
arbitrator held that his authority was unaffected by the Nota Bene if the
alleged action was not an exercise of academic judgment or a misuse of
procedure, but a violation of some substantive mandate of the collective
bargaining contract. Accordingly, despite a board policy against providing
reasons for nonappointment, the arbitrator called for reasons and retained
jurisdiction to determine the question of discrimination if the dispute was not
33
resolved.
33. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO v. City Univ. of New
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The administration had urged that the "academic judgment" exclusion
controlled. The arbitrator observed, however, that the facts, showing an
affirmative recommendation for appointment by subordinate authority and
an almost immediate negative reaction by the administration without the
physical presence of the individual's dossier, demonstrated an abrupt, arbitrary exercise of authority, not an "academic" decision. He continued:
To find otherwise would be to make any negative determination by one
or another level of authority at the University a final and binding act
completely invulnerable to review simply by reference to the status of
the individual rendering it. A decision by the Dean of Faculty to
recommend appointment or not to recommend appointment may well
be an 'academic decision' in the vast majority of instances. The fact
that it is a decision by the Dean of Faculty does not, however, per se
make it such an 'academic' type determination.8 4
Thus, the award held that the limitation on the arbitrator's jurisdiction did
not apply where the substantive breach of some contractual commitment has
been alleged. This result is sound, for a contrary conclusion would have
rendered the non-discrimination clause hortatory. What remains to be seen
is whether this approach has been followed elsewhere in conflicts over other
types of provisions.
(b) Academic Freedom. The collective bargaining agreement then
governing the faculty of Southeastern Massachusetts University contained an
article guaranteeing "Academic Freedom and Democracy" by providing,
inter alia, that the exercise of "legal . . . rights shall in no way jeopardize
the faculty member's position . . . . 135 A faculty member of some years of
service in the institution pursued a grievance concerning his transfer by the
institution's president from the education department, of which he had been
the acting chairman, to the department of English. The contract made no
provision for faculty transfers but did contain an article on management
rights, and the pre-existing policies of the board of trustees set forth the right
to transfer. The arbitrator held that, "The Administration is not required to
prove 'just cause' for transferring a professor. It is a management right and
as a result action under it does not require a defense."8 6
York, AAA Case No. 1339-0206-70 (June 17, 1970) (Christensen, Arbitrator) [not
currently on file].
34. Id. at 14. The result has been followed in CUNY and elsewhere. For example,
the issue was also raised by the allegation that the refusal to appoint the grievant as a
department chairman in one of the Chicago city colleges was due to his union activity
and, therefore, violative of the non-discrimination clause. The collective agreement
required that the dean of the campus consult with eligible members of a department prior
to appointing a chairman and state his reasons for the appointment in writing. The
grievant was proposed by his department in a 7-4 vote; the other candidate was the
incumbent, whom the dean nevertheless reappointed to the chair. The arbitrator
observed that under the contract only the advice, not the consent, of the department was
required. The dean's authority was, he held, "virtually absolute" except as limited by the
nondiscrimination provision pursuant to which the dean cannot refuse to appoint "if the
sole and only reason ... is disapproval based on union activities." Board of the Junior
College, Dist. 508, Chicago, Illinois v. AFT Cook County Teachers Union, Local 1600,
AAA Case No. 5130-0044-68, at 6, 7 (July 9, 1968) (Davis, Arbitrator).
35. SMU Faculty Fed'n Chapter 1895, AFT v. Board of Trustees, SMU, AAA Case
No. 1139-0490-70, at 11 (March 10, 1971) (Kennedy, Arbitrator) [not currently on

file].

36. Id.
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Inasmuch as a violation of the substantive provision on academic freedom
had been alleged, however, the arbitrator observed that the right to transfer
did not free the administration to violate other sections of the contract in the
process of effectuating the transfer. Thus, the arbitrator noted that transferring a teacher "for the purpose of denying him the freedom to discuss
controversial . . .issues" 37 in the department from which he was being
transferred would be a violation of the contract terms. Reasons for and the
circumstances surrounding the transfer were given by the president of the
institution and were held to be plausible. The arbitrator denied the
grievance, noting that, "a charge of violation of academic freedom constitutes
a very serious allegation against anyone in academic administration and
by a clear preponderance of evi• . . we believe it must be supported
38
case.
instant
the
in
found
not
dence"
About the time the above dispute was decided, however, another arbitrator was called on to decide the arbitrability of an alleged violation of
academic freedom in a decision not to renew the appointment of a nontenured faculty member at the same institution. The collective agreement
contained a dismissal procedure for tenured faculty requiring "just cause"
and a right to a hearing before the board of trustees, and limiting any
subsequent recourse to judicial review. The agreement also provided for a
detailed evaluation of nontenured faculty by peers on both a departmental
and institution-wide basis, but distinguished tenured from nontenured status
by requiring the provision of reasons for dismissals of tenured faculty only.
The arbitrator reasoned that the procedures for dismissal of tenured
faculty substituted judicial review for arbitration and served, in effect, to bar
recourse to the grievance procedure.
Although Article VIII [on tenure] does not specifically state that
nontenured faculty members shall have no right of appeal, it does state
that they need not be given the reasons for dismissal, and specifically
reserves the 'just cause standard' only to the tenured faculty. For us to
hold that the exclusion of tenured faculty members from right of appeal
to the grievance procedure does not extend to nontenured faculty
members in the light of the specific language and obvious intent of
Article VIII, would be to grant such nontenured faculty members
greater rights under the Agreement than tenured faculty members. We
find no contractual or practical basis for so doing, particularly when
considering the superior status attached in the academic world to
possession of tenure.3 9
An opposite conclusion in the second case could have been drawn had the
arbitrator opined that the sought-for review did not confer greater rights on
nontenured faculty than on tenured colleagues but merely supplied a different forum. While the dismissal of a tenured faculty member could be
effected only through a prior hearing on the basis of "just cause" before the
board of trustees with a right of subsequent judicial review, an allegation by
37. Id. at 21.
38.

Id. at 23.

39. Board of Trustees, Southeastern Mass. Univ. v. SMU Faculty Fed'n, Local 1895,
AFT, AAA Case No. 1139-0528-70, at 8 (April 6, 1971)

currently on file].

(Zack, Arbitrator)

[not
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a nontenured faculty member of a violation of his academic freedom by a
decision not to renew would be heard under the approach not adopted
through the more informal machinery of the grievance procedure. Unlike
the board hearing the administration would not be required to demonstrate
"just cause" for its decision, nor would it have to state its reasons, at least
initially. The burden would rest on the grievant to prove a violation of the
academic freedom guarantee and, assuming sufficient evidence is produced
to establish a prima facie case, the arbitrator could then require the
administration to come forward with an explanation for its decision. This
alternative approach is consistent with the "superior status" of tenure in the
academic world on which the arbitrator relied without further elaboration to
buttress his reasoning.
In the two Massachusetts decisions the arbitrators were called on, in
effect, to weigh competing values reflected in ambiguous contractual provisions. In the first award the guarantee of academic freedom took precedence over "management rights." In the second the arbitrator construed the
contract narrowly, based on the disclaimer for the provision of reasons, the
effect of which, however, was to render the agreement's guarantee of
academic freedom essentially hortatory in nonrenewal cases.
(c) Substantive Criteria for Faculty Status Decisions. The criteria for
faculty status decisions may be provided directly in the collective agreement
or may be found in general institutional policy and practice incorporated by
reference or by a "past practice" clause. In addition, an "academic
judgment" exemption is often coupled with a provision safeguarding the
operational role of collegial bodies. However, unlike the determination of
what constitutes an academic judgment or whether impermissible considerations played a significant role in the negative decision, consideration of the
application of institutional critieria inject the arbitrator more directly into the
decision-making process. The following is illustrative.
A group of part-time lecturers in two science departments of Brooklyn
College of CUNY were notified of nonreappointment due solely to a
change in the personnel policies of their departments which had decided to
seek active doctoral candiates or individuals already possessing the doctorate
for these positions. A contract provision headed "Notice of Appointment
and Reappointment" applicable to part-time faculty set out as one category
of faculty subject to nonreappointment, those whose nonrenewals are occasioned by insufficient registration, financial inability, or changes in curriculum. The contract also established a departmental preferential rehiring list
for those individuals whose appointments are terminated on any of these
grounds.
The arbitrator held that the exclusive permissible bases for the termination
of part-time faculty were the three set out in the above provision, in addition
to poor evaluation and misconduct. 40 He reasoned that "[i]f the University
40. City Univ. of New York v. Local No. 1460, UFCT, AFL-CIO, AAA Case No.
1330-0207-70, at 5 (May 25, 1970) (Wildebush, Arbitrator) [not currently on file].
Although the basis of poor evaluation was dealt with in another provision of the contract, no provision concerning termination for misconduct was present. However, mis-
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had the right not to reappoint part-time employees because of a change in
personnel policies, such employees would have no preferential rehiring rights
under the contract."'41 This, he opined, would constitute a form of
discrimination against them not intended by the parties. In ordering the
reappointment of the complainants, he acknowledged but discounted the
University's argument that it should be permissible to replace a nontenured
faculty member with one more highly qualified:
The philosophy of hiring the best personnel available is of course
commendable, and it is presumed whenever anyone is hired, at the
time of such hiring, he is the best available. The upgrading of a
faculty is also desirable but may not be done at the expense of violating
a contract. The term 'upgrading' is, of course, a subjective term. The
mere holding of a doctorate, or taking courses toward a doctorate, does
not of itself mean that such an individual would make a good lecturer
or professor, nor that a faculty would necessarily be42upgraded by having
such an individual become a member of the faculty.
A month after the above award another case was decided by a different
arbitrator concerning the nonrenewal of appointment of a full-time lecturer
in Hunter College of CUNY. 43 The department's personnel committee had
notified the faculty member that its decision was based on the changing
character of course requirements, the attendant uncertainty of assignable
classes, and the failure of the faculty member to pursue a doctorate. To the
union's allegation that assignable classes were available the arbitrator responded that the determinations of what classes are to be given which
individuals is encompassed in the "academic judgment" exclusion.
The question posed with respect to progress toward the doctorate was, the
arbitrator observed, "more difficult." The contract provided that full-time
lecturers acquire a form of administrative tenure and limited the use of the
title to "faculty who are hired to teach and perform related faculty functions
but do not have a research commitment." On the other hand, part-time
lectureships are limited to "people who are working toward a doctorate on a
full-time basis and are to be employed as part-time teaching or research
personnel." The arbitrator found the language of the job title provision as
fully contemplating a continued interest and effort by its holders in obtaining a
doctorate: "While my personal evaluation of the necessity for receipt of (or
study for) the Ph.D. degree might well vary from that adopted by the
Grievant's department, it is impossible for me to find and conclude other
than that this is, in rather pristine form, a matter of 'academic judgment.' 44
The arbitrator took note of the prior award, but observed that it was based
on provisions solely applicable to part-time lecturers. In concluding that this
refusal of reappointment is not subject to arbitral reversal, he underlined that
conduct is "commonly recognized by courts and arbitrators as a reason for dismissal or
nonreappointment, because it involves a lack of fitness to teach, a failure to meet standards of conduct, express or implied." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4.
43. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFT, AFL-CIO v. City Univ. of
New York, AAA Case No. 1339-0284-70 (June 23, 1970) (Christensen, Arbitrator)
[not currently on file].
44. Id. at 12.
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unlimited or unreviewable authority with respect to appointments cannot be
exercised by the administration.
[W]here such a denial of appointment or reappointment clashes with a
provision of the Agreement it cannot be termed protected as an
exercise of 'academic judgment;' that judgment has, in such instances,
been made subordinate to a contractual limitation fully within the
arbitrator's power to interpret and apply. Finally, failure to supply
any reason for a refusal to appoint or reappoint, while possibly an
option legally available to the Board prior to the execution of this
is now subject to application of the terms of that conAgreement,
45
tract.
Eleven months later an award concerning the nonrenewal of a full-time
lecturer in Queens College was handed down by the arbitrator who decided
the part-time lecturers' case.48 The faculty member had been recommended for nonrenewal by the departmental personnel committee entirely on the
basis that he lacked a doctorate. The arbitrator held the matter to be
arbitrable under the contractural provision defining the position of full-time
lecturer. He reasoned that inasmuch as such an appointee has, by definition, no research commitment and as the Ph.D. is a research degree, the
reliance on its absence as the sole basis for nonrenewal was impermissible
under that section of the agreement. While he distinguished the prior case
both on the difference between arguments advanced by the union in each
case and on the variance in the facts, he nevertheless departed squarely from
the substance of the prior decision:
The reading into Article 13.1 [defining a full-time lecturer] a requirement for a Ph.D. as a matter of 'academic judgment' appears to the
undersigned as a very substantial deviation from the language of the
contract, and imposes a condition which was not negotiated by the
parties.
This arbitrator recognizes that scholarly research could be helpful to
teaching effectiveness. He also recognizes that many academicians
equate the possession of a Ph.D. with scholarly research. However,
the contract bars the University from using the criteria of scholarly
research and the lack of a Ph.D. as the sole grounds for denying
reappointment . . .47
Thus, the arbitrator treated the department's action as reading into the
contract's job definition the impermissible requirement of a doctorate. However, the job definition neither mandated nor prohibited, on its face, a
doctoral requirement, and the policy of Queens College prior to the contract
required a Ph.D.48 Further, the faculty of the City University enjoyed a
good deal of professional autonomy and the contract contained explicit language reflecting an intent not to diminish the rights of the faculty unless in
explicit conflict with the terms of the agreement. From this perspective the
academic department did not abuse a prerogative by reading into the contract
45. Id. at 13.
46. City Univ. of New York v. United Fed'n of College Teachers, AFT, Local 1460,
AFL-CIO, AAA Case No. 1330-0286-70 (May 26, 1971) (Wildebush, Arbitrator).
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 14.
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"a condition not negotiated by the parties," but exercised a pre-existing right
of a professional character, recognized in the institution's policies, to set its
standards for membership.
It is curious that in the part-time lecturers' case the arbitrator had no
difficulty in reading misconduct into the contract as a valid basis for
termination (raising the interesting question of how that misconduct would
be determined in the absence of contractual provisions dealing with it) but
encountered difficulty in allowing the faculty of an academic department to
set the qualifications requisite for reappointment in spite of the Nota Bene.
The reasoning of the arbitrator is strained since preferential rehiring is
established apparently for those otherwise qualified to teach but whose
classes are cancelled due to reduced enrollment, financial inability, or
curricular change. The departmental judgment involved addresses the
threshold question of the individual's teaching qualifications. On balance
the arbitrator has in both the part-time and full-time cases reviewed the
reasonableness of the department's standards for the qualification of its
members which, he admits, were not patently without foundation.
An ostensibly more procedural approach was taken in a nonrenewal case
in CUNY where the grievant challenged the faculty action not to renew
under a provision of the collective agreement requiring that no lecturer "shall
be denied reappointment on the basis of incompetence" unless two of the
three preceding evaluations indicated unsatisfactory performance. The arbitrator held that whether or not that requirement was met was arbitrable,
notwithstanding the Nota Bene.49 He reviewed the faculty evaluations of
the grievant, and concluded that they constituted an unfavorable judgment.
While avoiding the question of the tenability of that conclusion, the arbitrator expressed concern that the language of the evaluations did not expressly
state that the grievant's work was unsatisfactory, although the grievant
understood them to constitute an unfavorable judgment. Accordingly, he
laid down a rule for future treatment:
I cannot conclude without adding the observation that while the
newness of the parties' contractual relationship and the procedures
contained therein might excuse some looseness in the actual conduct of
these procedures, the fact that evaluation summaries are of such direct
importance to continued employment and the experience of this case
would lead me in the future to disregard [where a similar allegation
under this section of the agreement is presented] any such summary
that did not directly if not in haec verba warn the individual of the fact
of unsatisfactory professional performance. 50
At first blush this statement is no more than sound interstitial legislation.
Procedural rigor by the faculty was substituted for the arbitral consideration
of whether the grievant was in fact found to be incompetent based on an
independent scrutiny of the evaluation reports. As a practical matter,
however, the award might place considerable pressure on the department to
49. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 v. Board of Higher Educ. of the
City of New York, AAA Case No. 1339-0279-71 (Jan. 12, 1972) (Christensen,
Arbitrator).
50. Id. at 16.
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rate as many faculty members as possible "unsatisfactory" simply to retain
flexibility at the time a final recommendation must be made, since a
nonrenewal recommendation in the absence of such an explicitly negative
evaluation would raise a question of an arbitrary use of the evaluation
procedure. On the other hand, a discernible pattern of negative evaluations
made simply to retain flexibility also could be considered an arbitrary use of
procedure. Thus, under either result the arbitrator would be called on to
treat the underlying merits in order to determine whether the contractual
requirement was applied properly. Fortunately, at least from the perspective of academic processes, a later award obviated the need to resort to this
measure by rejecting the union's argument that a lecturer was entitled to
reappointment unless rated unsatisfactory in two of the last three evaluations, thus allowing the peer group to select from among a group of
51
admittedly well qualified candidates.
In grievances based on the misapplication or non-application of the
criteria established for the decision, the arbitrator has, in effect, been called
on to balance the individual interest of the faculty member, the collegial
interests of the faculty, and the collective interests of the faculty bargaining
agent in the context of perhaps ambiguous or conflicting regulatory provisions. A decision to hold the matter arbitrable reflects a judgment not only
of the manner in which the balance should be struck, but also of the
arbitrator's competence ultimately to decide the merits. As the dispute over
the Ph.D. requirement illustrates, once the gate is opened to review of the
criteria applied an arbitrator could conceivably achieve a result at variance
with recognized institutional practice. On the other hand, a declination to
hold the matter arbitrable at all may loosen discretion beyond the bounds
contemplated by the institution's personnel policies.
These awards dealt with decisions recommended initially by the faculty
and confirmed by the administration. The issues are expanded when the
administration fails to concur in a faculty recommendation, in that the interest
in maintaining the system of peer participation is added to the balance the
arbitrator must strike. The issue was posed rather crisply in the context of
relatively unambiguous contract language governing the New York Institute
of Technology-a private four-year institution. 52 The agreement provided
for faculty recommendations on personnel decisions followed by administrative review and presentation to the governing board for final action. In
addition, the agreement explicitly provided that "[p]rocedures shall follow
AAUP [American Association of University Professors] guidelines for the
51. Board

of Higher

Educ.,

City

of New

York v.

Professional Staff

Congress/CUNY, AAA Case No. 1339-1156-73 (June 11, 1974) (Kahn, Arbitrator).
The Union later sought unsuccessfully to secure a similar provision in the collective
agreement. See Finkin, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: An Independent Perspective, 3 J. LAW & EDUC. 439 (1974).
52. New York Institute of Technology v. Council of Metropolitan & Old Westbury
Chapters AAUP, AAA Case No. 1330-0635-75 (March 18, 1976) (Knowlton, Arbitrator). Upon compulsion by a state court the case proceeded to arbitration. New York
Institute of Technology v. AAUP, 47 App. Div. 2d 659, 364 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1975). See
also text accompanying notes 75-77 infra concerning the interpretation of the Statement
on Government under a different contract.
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governance of the college," and the grievance procedure itself provided that
if the faculty's collective bargaining agent "decides that the remedy is not in
accord with the AAUP Guidelines for Governance of Colleges [sic] (which
the college has agreed to)," then the case may be taken to arbitration. It
was agreed that the "guidelines" referred to was the Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities drafted jointly by the AAUP, the American
Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges; that is, the three leading national organizations of faculty,
institutions, and trustees. The Statement provides that faculty status decisions
are the "primary responsibility" of the faculty with which the president and
governing board should concur "except in rare instances and for compelling
reasons which should be stated in detail."
When the affirmative recommendations of the faculty in two tenure cases
were rejected by the Institute's governing board the faculty sought to
arbitrate whether the Statement on Government had been adhered to. The
administration argued that the dispute was not arbitrable inasmuch as it had
never explicitly agreed to be bound by the Statement on Government. After
reviewing conflicting evidence on bargaining history, the arbitrator held that
the Statement on Government, which he seems to have viewed as admonitory rather than directive, had not been expressly incorporated into the
contract, unlike the incorporation of other AAUP Statements and the

adoption of express personnel procedures requiring faculty participation. The
unarticulated assumption of an analytically slender award seems to be that
any derogation from "management's" control of personnel decisions must be
more clearly provided.53
53. Note, however, the rather different analysis supplied by Arbitrator Myron Joseph
in deciding whether the collective agreement's provisions governing the faculty's role in
the selection of department heads necessarily proscribed the administration's abolition of
that position for a particular department:
The Department Head, nominated by the department members, plays an
important participative role in many of the College's decision processes.
Through and with the Department Head the faculty shares in this participation. If, as the College argues, it has the right to determine whether or
not a Department can have a Department Head, the College would have
the power to deprive selective groups of faculty members of major rights
that were written into the Agreement as a result of Collective Bargaining.
Such an unusual and improbable interpretation would require clear and
compelling language that spelled out the parties' intent.
Community College of Allegheny County v. American Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2067,
AAA Case No. 55-39-0008-73, at 7-8 (May 18, 1973) (Joseph, Arbitrator).
The arbitral confrontation with analogous issues has not been entirely consistent. See
Senate Professional Ass'n v. New York (State University of New York at Binghamton),
OER File No. PS-SU-BI-l (Jan. 22, 1973) (Yagoda, Arbitrator) (the chancellor of the
university had authority to delete a non-tenured faculty "line" in a department thereby
precluding renewal of the incumbent even though the procedures for evaluation and
renewal would be circumvented); Lansing Community College Chapter, MAHE v. Board
of Trustees of Lansing Community College, AAA Case No. 5439-228-71 (June 9, 1971)
(Heilbrun, Arbitrator) (the board had the power to adopt policy for student evaluation
of faculty but lacked the power to use the results in promotion decisions pending
agreement with the faculty on such use); Bucks County Community College v. Bucks
County Community College Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 2238, AFI', AFL-CIO, AAA
Case No. 1430-0239-74S (undated) (unsigned) (the failure to include retirement as
a valid ground for discontinuance of a tenured professor in the collective agreement
precluded the adoption of a mandatory retirement policy and its application to a senior
faculty member); Bryant College Faculty Fed'n, Local 1769, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bryant
College of Business Administration, AAA Case No. 1130-0313-75 (Oct. 17, 1975)
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A similar reluctance to reach the merits was reflected in ambiguous
language in the collective agreement governing Onondaga Community College.5 4 The agreement provided that decisions on reappointment be made
by the board of trustees following the recommendation of the academic
department, the faculty committee on reappointments, promotion, and tenure, and the institution's president. A hearing procedure was provided for
dismissal of tenured faculty, the sole grounds for which were either the
failure to maintain teaching standards or moral turpitude. An appendix to
the agreement provided a hearing procedure for currently employed nontenured faculty who alleged that considerations violative of academic freedom
played a significant role in nonrenewal decisions and allowed resort to
arbitration in the event the complainant was dissatisfied with the resulting
review. The provision on nonreappointment recited that "[tihe reasons for
nonrenewal of a term contract are the same as those for termination of
tenured faculty members except that no reasons need be given to the
individual concerned."
Two faculty members were recommended favorably for renewal by the
faculty reappointments, promotion, and tenure (RPT) committee, a decision
in which the administration did not concur. The arbitrator held the
grievance to be nonarbitrable; the contract showed that the discretion not to
renew was lodged in the administration without provision for review even
though the grounds to which the administration was supposed to address
itself were specified. He cited the "well-established background of practice"
in the academic world as requiring unequivocal language in the contract to
establish review of the reasons for nonrenewal. In an effort to offer
assurance that academic freedom was not infringed in nonreappointment
decisions, he observed that academic freedom allegations were expressly
reserved in the contract to an internal hearing procedure and were not raised
in the case.
In the event the administration disagreed with the recommendation of the
RPT committee the contract provided that the matter "shall be returned to
the Committee with reasons in writing." 55 The arbitrator observed that the
procedure was intended to "bring before the administration the faculty
opinion with respect to the teaching and scholarly abilities" 56 of the candi(Teele, Arbitrator) (tenure criteria permitted the institution to require a Ph.D. of a
candidate recommended by his department even though past application of the criteria
had never so required).
54. Onondaga Community College v. Onondaga Community College Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 1845, AFT, AFL-CIO (May 22, 1969) (Hyman, Arbitrator) [not currently on file]. Two-year institutions often lack a well developed system of faculty government and thus may be more akin to the public schools than to colleges or universities.
Finkin, Collective Bargaining and University Government, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 125, 127.
Nevertheless, available awards which reflect problems similar to those encountered at
the four-year level will be discussed. Indeed, it has been suggested that such institutions
are most likely to use collective bargaining to advance a heretofore nascent faculty government. F. KEMERER & J. BALDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 7.
55. Onondaga Community College v. Onondaga Community College Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 1845, AFT, AFL-CIO, at 13 (May 22, 1969) (Hyman, Arbitrator) [not
currently on file]. The recitation of the facts in the award is silent on the question of
whether such reasons were supplied by the administration to the committee. No reasons
of any kind appear in the text.
56. Id. at 18.
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date and did not subject the grounds for nonrenewal "to review by any
committee established under the collective agreement,"' 57 or by the arbitrator.
An alternative reading of the contract was available inasmuch as reasons
for non-concurrence were required to be supplied to the RPT committee, but
the instant award failed to indicate whether those reasons were provided.
Indeed a contrary result was achieved under a successor agreement which,
from the award, does not seem to have varied the relevant terms substantially.58 In this later case the Onondaga trustees accepted only fourteen of
thirty-five candidates recommended to it for promotion by the RPT committee. That decision was reversed and a remedy fashioned after the arbitrator
failed to "detect a rational basis to support the trustees' selections for
promotion." 59 The first Onondaga and NYIT awards render the governance provisions largely ritualistic. The second Onondaga decision requires
not only cooperation but rationality; thus, the arbitrator is enmeshed in the
merits of promotion decisions at least when the administration and faculty
disagree.
An intermediate course, charted by Arbitrator Russell Smith, fosters
cooperation without confronting the question of later review of the grounds
for disagreement. 60 This case concerned four nontenured professors at
Oakland University (Michigan) who had been recommended for tenure by
their respective departments and by the college-wide tenure committee. The
dean of the school failed to concur in one of the four recommendations, all
of which were transmitted to a university tenure and appointment policy
(UTAP) committee consisting of a majority of the faculty and some
members of the administration. The UTAP committee recommended the
award of tenure in the three cases and concurred with the dean's recommendation to deny tenure in the fourth. The provost, with whom the president
concurred, recommended the denial of tenure for all four professors. The
trustees were presented essentially with the bare recommendations and
sustained the president.
The collective agreement contained a management rights article as well as
provisions guaranteeing continued adherence to faculty policies, practices,
and procedures. The agreement also adopted the procedure-substance
distinction for the purposes of arbitration. Nevertheless, Arbitrator Smith,
holding for the three grievants recommended for tenure and against the
fourth, stated:
I determine

. . .

that the method used in communicating or transmit-

ting the substance of the faculty action to the Board was deficient. But
this deficiency in my opinion cannot be dismissed as of no significance.
It is quite conceivable that had the communication included the
elements stated above the members of the Board would have been
57. Id. at 17.
58. Onondaga Community College Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1845 v. Onondaga
Community College, AAA Case No. 15-37-0151-73 (Sept. 14, 1973) (Dennis, Arbitrator).
59. Id. at 8.
60. Oakland Univ. Chapter, AAUP v. Oakland Univ. (May 17, 1974) (Smith,
Arbitrator).
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substantially more alerted and attuned to the seriousness of a disagreement between top administration and faculty than they were, with the
consequence that at least some of them would have given much more
consideration to the basis and merits of the disagreement than they did.
It is even quite conceivable that the results would have been different.61
The award eschews the readily available mechanical solution adopted in
the NYIT and first Onondaga award. Arbitrator Smith clearly recognized
that the elaborate system of committee review was intended to implement
administration-faculty cooperation on personnel decisions. If mere formalism is to be avoided, the conduct of such a government necessarily implies
comity and candor between administration and faculty which it is the
arbitrator's role to foster. On the other hand, Arbitrator Smith was not
prepared, as was the arbitrator in the second Onondaga case, to assume
jurisdiction unequivocally to decide the rationality of whatever reasons might
eventually emerge from the trustees for their failure to agree with the
faculty's recommendation. Thus, whether the procedural distinction will
either degenerate into formalism or expand to encompass review of the
merits remains to be seen.
(3)

An Assessment.

The practical implications of the procedure-substance dichotomy are wellstated by Arbitrator Clyde Summers:
What is at once apparent is that primary reliance is placed on
procedures to give assurance as to appropriate substantive results. The
only guarantee a faculty member has of fairness is in the procedures,
for the result is beyond review, and the procedure is carefully designed
to that end. When such complete reliance is placed on procedure and
there is no review of the result, then the procedure must be carefully
followed to give the full protection intended. Those charged with
carrying out the procedures can not wander or take short cuts; they
must keep within the lines and turn square corners. This does not
mean that inconsequential deviations will necessarily void the procedures, but it does mean that any substantial failure to follow the
prescribed procedure in letter or in spirit will be presumed to infect
the procedural
the result. The burden is on the one seeking to excuse
62
defect to show that it in no way affected the outcome.
Several consequences are at once apparent. Since the only guarantee of
fairness is procedural rigor, the faculty union labors under considerable
political pressure to elaborate in ever expanding detail the procedural
requirements in the collective agreement. To the extent this effort is
successful the likelihood of procedural error is increased. The union is also
under considerable pressure to pursue grievances on every procedural departure no matter how minor. 68 The result may be an extreme acceleration of
61. Id. at 35.
62. Wagner College Chapter, AAUP v. Wagner College, AAA Case No. 1330-073675, at 8 (Oct. 7, 1975) (Summers, Arbitrator).
63. In CUNY some arbitrators have been at pains to distinguish de minimis
procedural error from that which is fatal to the decision. See, e.g., Board of Higher
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the "contract focus" of faculty status decisions which, over time, can only
64
have a deleterious effect on academic life.
To be sure, some of the awards discussed arise in the context of
ambiguous contract language, and, as Professor Weisberger has suggested,
the "failure to define academic judgment, or other similar words of art,
coupled with the use of ad hoc arbitrators, invites a wide range of results."6 5
Greater precision, however, might only clarify rather than resolve the
dilemma, for it seems beyond doubt that, unless explicitly exempted from
arbitration in the contract, the procedure-substance or "academic judgment"
distinctions, no matter how carefully worded, cannot avoid confronting
challenges either that the substantive criteria were misapplied, that the wrong
criteria were applied, or that the decision was based on proscribed considerations. 6 To be fully effective, however, the contract would have to exempt
all three categories, for the failure to exempt any one would encourage
litigation precisely at the margin. The practical result then would be the
elimination of any basis for challenge other than procedural fidelity which
could itself be erosive of academic values in the longer run.6 7 Accordingly,
inquiry should be directed to defining the terms and structure of an
arbitration system which candidly confronts the merits of faculty status
decisions.
B.

Review of the Merits of Faculty Status Decisions

Standards of "reasonableness," "just cause," or "arbitrariness" call for
largely subjective arbitral judgments. Thus, fear is expressed that the
arbitrator will intrude unduly and perhaps beyond his personal competence
into the merits of academic judgments by making essentially de novo decisions.6 8 The critical question lies in the assumptions the arbitrator brings to
the disposition of the case and the sources he looks to for guidance to inform
the standard.
Educ. of the City of New York v. Legislative Conference, AAA Case No. 1339-0397-71
(Jan. 12, 1972) (Friedman, Arbitrator); City University of New York v. Legislative
Conference (Dec. 14, 1971) (Scheiber, Arbitrator).
64. As a recent study concluded, "Although procedural regulations will help the
administration to rationalize its decisions and protect the faculty from arbitrariness, the
proliferation of organizational rules could create a situation best termed 'the paralysis of
the nitty gritty.'" F. KEMERER & J. BALDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 193.
65. J. Weisberger, supra note 4, at 21.
66. Thus, the debate concerning the degree of arbitral fidelity to the letter or spirit
of the academic judgment exemption obscures the fact that the distinction invites
grievances which perforce enmesh the arbitrator in the merits of the decision. Compare
Mintz & Golden, supra note 26, with Benewitz, In Defense of Academic Judgment: A
Comment, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 201 (1973).
67. Indeed, Professor Weisberger later suggests that "the procedural substantive
distinction may not be an adequate device to remove academic issues from grievance
arbitration" no matter how well thought out. J. Weisberger, supra note 4, at 39.
68. See, e.g., Oakland Community College v. Oakland Community College Faculty
Ass'n, 58 Lab. Arb. 316 (1972) (McCormick, Arbitrator) (a de novo judgment of a
faculty member's ability under a standard of "just and reasonable cause"). See also New
Jersey Institute of Technology (Newark College of Eng'r) v. Newark College of Eng'r
Professional Staff Ass'n, New Jersey Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n Docket No.
AR-279 (Aug. 4, 1975) (Berkowitz, Arbitrator) ("just cause" means specific conduct
amounting to cause for termination and not merely poor performance in lower level
course instruction).
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Faculty Selection, Retention, and Promotion.

The collective agreement governing the faculty of the University of Rhode
Island permits arbitral review of the merits of all faculty status decisions
under a somewhat convoluted arbitral standard.6 9 The burden of proof is
assigned to the grievant except in dismissal cases. Therefore, in a contested
promotion case the arbitrator construed the scope of an arbitration clause as
permitting arbitral review of procedural error and of whether a prescribed
factor was ignored or whether an impermissible one was permitted to play a
material role.70 But, he concluded, the evaluation provisions
could be rendered ineffectual as well, were the arbitrator to be wholly
foreclosed from review of the objective underpinning for the conclusions reached in the process. At this point the review of adherence to
process takes on an undeniably substantive aspect. There is risk that
once one opens this door, the incautious arbitrator will attempt to
substitute his primary judgment for that of the administrative decisionmakers. But the alternative is to ignore that the baseless, albeit honest,
subjective judgment is in essence a failure to follow a procedure which
aims to channel judgment within objective guidelines. Limited arbitral
review of the decisional base is called for in assuring full and fair
adherence to the contractual process regarding promotion. The limit
inheres in this: the administrative judgment should not be set aside1
except where there is no substantial objective basis for that judgment.
The arbitrator established a test of arbitrariness, and coupled the test with
a procedural component geared to institutional governance, stating:
,[W]here the Department Chairman and the Dean concur in the
recommendation, I think the prima facie case is made by (1) showing
that concurrence; (2) demonstrating 'that the recommendation was
grounded in the contractually relevant factors; (3) showing that the
recommendation was warranted-i.e., that the application of the factors justified the conclusion. .

.

.

Once that is done, it seems to me

that the University whose higher administrative level has 'disagreed,' is
obliged to explain the basis for that disagreement. Presumably, that
explanation will narrow the scope of examination, so that we may
determine
whether the claimed deficiency has any substantive objective
72
support.
69. The agreement between the State Board of Regents and the University of Rhode
Island AAUP provides in relevant part:

15.4.1 In any case of non-renewal, the burden of proof of the denial of

due process, legal rights, academic freedom, arbitrary or capricious
action shall be on the grievant, which proof shall be by a preponderance of evidence.
15.4.2 In any case of dismissal under tenure, the burden of proof shall be
on the University, which proof shall be by clear and convincing
evidence.
15.4.3 In cases dealing with non-renewal, promotion and award of tenure,
the burden of proof shall be on the grievant, which proof shall be
by a preponderance of evidence. The factors to be considered will
be those enumerated in the Article titled Annual Review, Section
18.5, insofar as they apply.
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case No.
1139-0798-73, at 10 (Aug. 16, 1974) (MacLeod, Arbitrator).
70. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case
No. 1139-0798-73 (Aug. 16, 1974) (MacLeod, Arbitrator).
71. Id. at 12-13.
72. Id. at 13.
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Accordingly, he found the affirmative recommendation amply supported and
the administration's reason for rejection entirely wanting in objective support.
In a promotion case decided at the University of Rhode Island shortly
after the above award another arbitrator agreed that the issue was whether
the president had a "reasonable basis" for denying a recommended promotion. 73 The arbitrator noted that the departmental vote was sharply divided, was opposed by the dean on the merits, and that there had been
inadequate time to conduct the contractually-mandated evaluation. He held
that the president's stated reason for declining to concur in the recommendation, a lack of sufficient substantial evidence to warrant promotion, had a
"reasonable basis" and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Implicit in the
award is recognition that a heavier burden to justify a negative decision is
assumed by the administration when it rejects a strongly affirmative (and
procedurally sound) peer recommendation. Similarly, in another tenure
case decided shortly thereafter at the University of Rhode Island Arbitrator
Stutz made clear that heavy reliance was placed on the overwhelmingly
negative vote of the grievant's department. 74 The awards at the University
of Rhode Island should be compared with the result under the contractual
language governing the faculty of the University of Bridgeport. That
language was designed to integrate more clearly arbitration as an extension
of institutional governance. Unlike the NYIT award discussed earlier, the
Bridgeport agreement explicitly incorporated the Statement on Government
of Colleges and Universities. Under the Statement faculty participation is

required in program planning and resource allocation. Moreover, faculty
are to have "primary responsibility" for curricular and faculty status decisions, subject to administrative reversal under the contract "in rare instances
and exceptional circumstances, for compelling reasons written in detail which
shall not be arbitrary nor capricious." The failure to act in accordance with
the Statement is also made explicitly arbitrable.
The administration had decided on the basis of a current and projected
decline in enrollment to limit the number of full-time faculty positions to
those then holding tenure in the University's College of Education. Accordingly, the president rejected two recommendations for renewal of appointment made by the faculty and dean of the college. The arbitrator held that
the instance was rare and the reason, a documented decline in enrollment,
was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 75 He held, therefore, that the action of
73. University of Rhode Island, AAUP v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case
No. 1139-0070-74 (Sept. 4, 1974) (Stutz, Arbitrator). Both this and the preceding
award were noted in Bucks County Community College Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2238,
AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bucks County Community College, AAA Case No. 1430-0998-74 S
(June 30, 1975) (Mogerman, Arbitrator), which held that the administration could
decline to promote a faculty member recommended by his department when subsequent
to the recommendation a substantial number of student complaints were filed and found
to be accurate after thorough administrative investigation. However, a better reading of
the University of Rhode Island cases would require the administration to return the
matter for the department's reconsideration based on the new material of which it had
not been aware at the time it acted.
74. University of Rhode Island, AAUP v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case
No. 1139-0161-73 (Oct. 8, 1974) (Stutz, Arbitrator).
75. University of Bridgeport v. AAUP, AAA Case No. 1239-006975 (Aug. 18,
1975) (Zack, Arbitrator).
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the administration was consistent with the Statement on Government and
denied the grievance.
The arbitrator proceeded on an assumption based on the bargaining history
preceding the contract that the faculty had secured an "erosion" of the
administration's "prerogative" in the area of faculty appointments which fell
short of "total authority" in view of the veto power reserved to the
president. 76 Accordingly, the issue was perceived as turning on the application of the "rare instances and for compelling reasons" test. On that issue,
however, the award supplied scant analysis of how the decline in enrollment
had actually affected the individual departments within the College of
Education. The arbitrator suggested that any decline in enrollment constituted per se grounds for administrative reversal of collegial judgments, i.e.,
that the Statement on Government had not "eroded" administrative "prerogative" to the extent of close arbitral scrutiny of its reasons. 77 The result
ignored the clear language of the Statement and, more particularly, the
commitment to maintain an institutional governance system.
In sum, the arbitrators in the University of Rhode Island cases attempted
to avoid de novo arbitral judgments of the merits by requiring procedural
rigor and objective information, and by placing an added burden on the
administration when it declines to concur in peer judgments. 78 The latter
76. Id. at 11. Arbitrator Zack's approach seems quite similar to the approach taken
by Arbitrator Knowlton in the NYIT case discussed in the text accompanying note 52
supra.
77. A similar paucity of analysis is found in Genessee Community College Educ.
Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of Genessee Community College (Dec. 20, 1971) (Roumell,
Arbitrator), concerning the administration's failure to concur in an academic department's recommendation of an appointee. The arbitrator held that the administration was
not obliged to accept the recommendation, but could not reject it for arbitrary reasons.
The candidate was employed in a Canadian university where he had a light teaching
schedule and was apparently engaged in a good deal of research. His desire to move was
motivated by the wishes of his family. The administration concluded that such motivation "would not be conducive to a person being asked to teach in a large community
college with a heavy class schedule." Id. at 10. The arbitrator found the reason not to
be arbitrary, although this was the first instance of a rejection of such a faculty
recommendation. As in the Bridgeport case, the arbitrator chose neither to examine the
factual underpinning for the rejection nor to give weight to the faculty recommendation.
78. But see Bryant College Faculty Fed'n, Local 1769, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bryant
College of Business Adm'n, AAA Case No. 1130-0313-75 (Oct. 17, 1975) (Teele,
Arbitrator) (the lack of a Ph.D. was a valid ground for refusing to accept an affirmative
faculty tenure recommendation). The award is unclear. On the one hand the award
can be interpreted as sustaining an across-the-board effort to "upgrade" the faculty. If
this interpretation is correct, the award suffers from the infirmity suggested in conjunction
with the text accompanying notes 30-32 supra. On the other hand the college's rules
incorporated in the collective agreement explicitly required "[pirogress toward or
achievement of advanced degrees" as a criterion for tenure. To that extent the result is
consistent with the University of Rhode Island awards. Cf. University of Hawaii v.
University of Hawaii Professional Assembly (Grievance of Dr. A) (March 31, 1976)
(Tsukiyama, Arbitrator) where the grievant's departmental recommendation for tenure
(but not promotion) had been concurred in by several layers of faculty and administrative review but rejected at the final administrative stage. The contract provided for
review under a standard of arbitrariness. The arbitrator held the stated ground not to
be arbitrary; the reason for reversal was disagreement that the grievant's teaching and
institutional service outweighed an undisputed poor record as a researcher. The arbitrator rejected the argument that the faculty judgment should be given primary weight,
because no such standard was explicitly incorporated in the contract. Thus it is inconsistent with the approach in the above University of Rhode Island cases. The arbitrator
buttressed the result by reasoning that, "[elach level of review was expected to render
[an] independent judgment." Id. at 18. Since all review past the departmental level
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requirement, created by the arbitrators in aid of analysis, essentially builds
upon the peer judgment system and anticipates administrative concurrence
save in rare and compelling cases. The Bridgeport award also attempts to
limit the scope of arbitral scrutiny by ignoring precisely that requirement
built into the collective agreement. Thus, the award holds that management
was within its "prerogative" and arbitral examination was foreclosed. 79
(2)

Faculty Dismissaland Discipline.

A challenge was presented to the issuance of formal reprimands to two
faculty members at Schoolcraft College, a two-year institution in Michigan.80
The grievants had been denied tenure without consideration of the formal
evaluation prepared for each of them pursuant to the collective agreement.
Their personal conduct, which the administration believed had a direct
bearing on the teacher-student relationship and which was the subject of the
reprimands, was the basis for the denial. The arbitrator held the refusal to
consider these evaluations to be a violation of the agreement and ordered the
faculty members reinstated. In so doing, however, he observed that in
exercising the contractual prerogative of awarding tenure, the administration
was not limited solely to the evaluation, which limitation would have the
effect of rendering the "prerogative" meaningless. He concluded that the
administration could validly take into account any conduct which would
constitute adequate cause for the termination of a tenured appointment. Such
conduct was specified in the contract as gross immorality or lapse of
professional integrity. The assessment of any other conduct would, he
reasoned, effectively hold nontenured faculty to a higher standard than
tenured. Accordingly, he turned to the propriety of the challenged action.
One of the reprimands was based on an article a grievant wrote for the
school newspaper under a byline indicating that he taught in the college. The
article, reproduced in substantial measure in the award, is fairly characterized by the arbitrator as being "critical of colleges in general and Schoolcraft
College in particular," although it is arguable whether the average academic
would agree with the arbitrator that the criticism is "severe." 8' The article
was limited to the materials prepared for and considered by those most proximate to

the candidate, the arbitrator's reasoning seems clearly erroneous.

However, the result

might well have been the same even had the faculty view been considered "primary."

79. This approach was also taken in University of Rhode Island AAUP v. Rhode
Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case No. 1139-0678-73 (Feb. 26, 1974) (Fallon, Arbitrator) holding, contra to prior practice, that "the administration has a right to exercise its

managerial authority reasonably, in the best interest of academic efficiency" in assigning
the grievant to teach extension courses.

Id. at 7.

80. Board of Trustees of Schoolcraft College v. Schoolcraft College Faculty Forum,
AAA Case No. 5440-0177-69 (Aug. 22, 1969) (Herman, Arbitrator) [not currently on
file]. One of the reprimands concerned the signing of a poster by both teachers along
with some tenured members of the faculty, about which the arbitrator expressed his
negative reactions. Inasmuch as this matter was the subject of a grievance submitted by
the reprimanded tenure faculty, the arbitrator permitted the instant reprimands to stand
or fall upon the outcome of that proceeding. This author has not been able to obtain
that award. Another incident concerned one of the grievant's abrupt departure from a

student ski excursion on which she was serving as a voluntary chaperone in order to
show her displeasure with student conduct. The third is treated in the text.
81. Id. at 10.
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were asked to inquire whether the college encouraged and provided an

environment for learning or served to hinder or even repress inquiry. If the
answer to the latter was affirmative, the article suggested that the school be
closed by the faculty and students.

Upholding the reprimand, the arbitrator found the article "lacking in
mature judgment" which "[could not] but be understood from a reading of
the article that he, the author, consider[ed] the school to be of little or no
value to its students. ' 82 To the argument that the publication was a
constitutionally protected activity, the arbitrator responded that the grievant
was asked to write the article "because of his interest in the school and its
pedagogical programs not as a disinterested citizen." He concluded that the

teachers
grievants' "rights as citizens must be respected, but their conduct as
' s3
control.
managerial
to
subject
[was]
school
their
as it affect[ed]
Unlike reasonableness or arbitrariness the imposition of discipline under a
standard of "lapse of professional integrity" can draw on substantial professional experience and some judicial experience with defining the bounds of
permissible and impermissible professorial conduct. From this perspective
the arbitrator seems rather clearly to have breached both the grievants'

academic freedom 84 and first amendment rights.8 5
A similar insensitivity is found in the award of an arbitral panel selected
outside the context of collective bargaining to resolve one of the more
celebrated recent academic controversies. In mid-December 1965, the
administration of St. John's University (N.Y.) notified thirty-three faculty
members of the nonrenewal of their appointments, and twenty-two of them
were immediately relieved of all classroom assignments. Following a faculty
82. Id. at 21.
83. Id.
84. Violations of academic freedom have been determined by the profession largely
through the investigations and reports of the American Association of University
Professors. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045,
1105-12 (1968); Finkin, supra note 18, and the sources cited therein. Based on the
precedents developed under the profession's "customary law" it is clear that the arbitrator
breached the grievants' academic freedom. See Academic Freedom and Tenure: Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 44 AAUP BULL. 158 (1958); Academic Freedom and
Tenure: The University of Illinois, 49 AAUP BULL. 25 (1963); Academic Freedom and
A recent report
Tenure: Oklahoma State University, 56 AAUP BULL. 62 (1970).
pointed out: "Any proponent of change in an institution or in society generally is likely
to encounter resistance, and the iconoclast who confers his blessing on unconventional
means for achieving unwelcome reforms is sure to arouse criticism." Academic Freedom
and Tenure: University of Florida, 56 AAUP BULL. 405, 413 (1970). Nevertheless, the
report stressed, "One of the risks of allowing a university to foster academic freedom is
that teachers and students alike may advocate and act on new and controversial views of
all manner of things." Id. See also Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom and the
Faculty Member as Citizen, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 525 (1963).
85. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Rampey v. Allen, 501
F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983
(1975). ("If it [the court] were to find that the decision not to renew his contract was
based on stands on campus issues with which the administration disagreed, the nonrenewal decision would be substantively defective under the first amendment .... "); State
ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 347, 269 P.2d 265 (1954); State ex rel.
Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959). See generally Van Alstyne,
The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Note,
Teachers' Freedom of Expression Outside the Classroom, 8 GA. L. Rv. 900 (1974).
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strike, the initiation of law suits, the investigation, report and censure of the
American Association of University Professors, and an order by the Middle
States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to show cause why
accreditation should not be revoked, the university offered to submit the
matter to a three-member panel for arbitration. The standard for determination in the case of the first of fourteen faculty accepting the terms of
arbitration was "whether under all of the circumstances then prevailing the
Board of Trustees . . . acted reasonably" in not reappointing the grievant
and in immediately relieving him from classroom assignment."6
The board of trustees argued that it had the right to make critical
determinations on the utilization of faculty so long as proper notice standards
were observed and full salary for the period of appointment was paid. Since
the notice of intent not to reappoint for the 1966-67 academic year was not
effected as required under university standards by October 1, 1965, the
arbitrators held that the faculty member was entitled to believe himself
87
reappointed for an additional academic year.
More significantly, the trustees argued they had a right to take the
disputed action since they considered the grievant "to be a disruptive
influence." They alleged he had sought both to alter radically the relationship of the university to the Catholic Church and to give the faculty final
control of its educational program. The grievant, on the other hand, argued
that the nonrenewal was the result of his activities in support of a teachers'
union and it therefore infringed upon his academic freedom.
The arbitration panel held that the grievant had the right as a matter of
academic freedom to challenge the institution's relationship to the church,
and to espouse faculty control of the curriculum, "provided only that he
exercise such right in proper circumstances. '88 They found no evidence,
however, that the university attempted to limit the exercise of academic
freedom or that the nonrenewal was based on the grievant's union activity.
Rather, the panel found that the grievant "engaged in a course of conduct
which was unbecoming to his role as a university professor"8' 9 and which
"would have supported a dismissal" had the university chosen to press
charges of unprofessional conduct through its established procedures.9 0 The
incidents summarized in support of this conclusion consisted of public utterances challenging the authority of various university officials, the distribution
of written material challenging the university, solicitation of student support
by picketing, distributing leaflets, and use of a public address system, and the
carrying of picket signs across the campus "in full clerical garb." 9' 1
Two additional incidents were specifically cited by the panel as buttressing
86. St. John's University v. Peter O'Reilly, AAA Case No. 11310-0343-68 (Jan. 22,
1970) (Root, Rivlin & Gates, Arbitrators). The entire proceedings, including conferences, required 13 days and resulted in 1700 pages of transcript and hundreds of pages of

documentary evidence.
87. The university had, however, terminated the grievant effective June 30, 1967,
and paid him for that period.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 7-8.

90. Id. at 11.
91. Id. at 8.
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its conclusion. First, the grievant, as chairman of a special faculty committee, had submitted for the consideration of a wider faculty body a statement
on academic freedom based on a statement prepared by the American Civil
Liberties Union. He had characterized the modifications to the ACLU
statement as "slight," but later, in the course of the arbitration hearing,
agreed that they were "material." The panel concluded that the grievant
was "guilty of a lack of candor" and that his characterization of the
modification "showed either such poor judgment or so low a level of
'92
professional ethics as to constitute conduct unbecoming a professor."
Secondly, in November 1965 the grievant had joined with seventeen other
members of his department in advertising in the New York Times their
availability for appointment elsewhere. The panel concluded that the
grievant was either guilty of joining a misleading advertisement or "that he
would have had 3no hesitation in breaching his contract if he found a suitable
'9
job elsewhere."
Accordingly, the panel held that the university had acted reasonably in the
decision not to renew. Inasmuch as the university had failed to comply with
its own regulations requiring charges and a hearing before suspension, the
panel held the suspension unreasonable. On the question of relief, however,
the panel found no basis for money damages since the grievant's full salary
had been paid. The equitable remedy by way of reinstatement, urged by
the grievant's counsel as necessary to remove the "chill which the actions of
the University have placed on academic freedom," was rejected. The panel,
noting its conclusions concerning the grievant's conduct, observed that he
who seeks equity must come with clean hands.
A degree of internal inconsistency exists in this award. 94 Having found
the purposes for the grievant's activities protected by academic freedom,
the panel scrutinized the grievant's conduct in the light of both academic
freedom and the standard of "conduct unbecoming" a university professor.
The panel, however, cited neither authority nor the custom of the academic
profession to justify its conclusion on the propriety of the grievant's conduct.
Thus, the university's arguments for nonrenewal summarized in terms of the
grievant's conduct and, more specifically, in terms of the substance of what
he had sought to achieve demonstrate that considerations violative of
academic freedom clearly played a significant role in the university's
decision. Further, the panel, in deciding whether a remedy was warranted,
gave no consideration to the institution's total disregard of its suspension and
dismissal procedures.
A similar eliding of the procedural aspects of a dismissal is found in an
95
award arising out of Bryant College, a private institution in Rhode Island.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. at 11.
94. These are treated in detail in a critique of the award published by the grievant's
union. Why St. John's University Must Remain on the AAUP List of Censured
Institutions: A Communication to the American Association of University Professors
from the United Federation of College Teachers, Local 1460, American Federation of
Teachers (AFL-CIO) (Undated).
95. Bryant Faculty Fed'n, Local 1769, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bryant College of Business
Adm'n, AAA Case No. 1130-0405-71 (Oct. 11, 1972) (Fallon, Arbitrator).
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The grievant, a tenured professor and union leader, had accepted a second
full-time position as a union staff member. The administration, citing
college policy, demanded that he resign one of the positions and upon his
refusal to comply presented the matter to the faculty's hearing committee.
Under the faculty manual, departures from which are arbitrable under the
collective agreement, a faculty member must prior to dismissal be given a
notice of charges and a hearing before a faculty committee whose recommendation is advisory to the president. Accordingly, the matter was
presented to the faculty committee and both parties were heard on November 8, 1971. On the same date the administration gave the hearing
committee until 10:00 a.m. on November 11 to tender its recommendation.
Although the administration was advised on November 11 that a joint
meeting of the hearing committee and the faculty executive committee was
scheduled for November 15, the administration summarily dismissed the
grievant.
The arbitrator held that adequate cause existed to dismiss the individual
under the college's faculty manual, and that the union had failed to show
that the dual employment policy was not consistently and uniformly applied.
Perhaps more important, he held that the administration's time demand was
"eminently reasonable," that there was no "moderately good reason" for the
faculty delay, and that the committee's failure to comply with the ultimatum
constituted a waiver of the procedural requirement.
The . . . [faculty] Committee cannot prevent the administration
from taking what it considers to be necessary termination action by
delaying a recommendation to the President. To allow such a tactic to
succeed would be to permit a faculty committee authority, under the
guise of due process and strict adherence to procedural requirements, to
intrude on management's96contractual right to discharge for what it
considers to be just cause.
Indeed, he strongly supported that action as a justified management response
to an insubordinate employee. Of course, the result might have been the
same had the arbitrator ordered the matter returned to the hearing committee for its recommendation, inasmuch as that report would have been only
advisory. Moreover, the result on the merits of the discharge may be sound.
Nevertheless, a faculty hearing committee would have been in a better position than the administration to know of actual institutional practices respecting
outside employment.9 7 Even if the facts found by the arbitrator were
correct, the faculty committee had an important contribution to make in
determining whether in light of the faculty member's contribution to the
96. Id. at 16.
97. Cf. Cook County College Teachers' Union v. Chicago City College Board 508,
AAA Case No. 51-30-0272-68 (Dec. 27, 1968) (McGury, Arbitrator) (a teacher cannot
be dismissed for holding two full-time positions in the absence of a clear rule against it

and where there was "no attempt to prove that the grievant's prior teaching load had any
adverse effect on his teaching ......
Id. at 9). See also Ferris State College v. 'Ferris
State College Faculty Ass'n, AAA Case No. 5439-0486-74 (Nov. 2, 1974) (Roumell,
Arbitrator) (sustaining the adoption of a rule requiring prior administrative approvals
for outside remunerated activities without bargaining with the faculty bargaining agent

inasmuch as the collective agreement permitted the administration to adopt "reasonable
policies").
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institution in the past the penalty of dismissal or some lesser sanction should
have been imposed. It is conceivable that the entire dispute would have
been obviated once the grievant had the benefit of a faculty position on the
correctness of the administration stand. But more important than the
specific outcome of this case is the fact that the failure to give sufficient
weight to the faculty hearing procedure, indeed the denigrating treatment of
it, simply eviscerates the fundamental guaranty that professional judgments
will have a voice on matters as critical as the dismissal for cause of a tenured
faculty member.98
(3)

DiscriminationDue to Union Activity.

Since arbitrators may have more experience in dealing with violations of
provisions prohibiting discrimination due to union activity than with determining the merits of faculty status decisions in higher education, one would
expect less perplexing treatment of this issue. In one instance the grievant
alleged that the failure of the administration to appoint him as a department
chairman in one of the Chicago city colleges, after a recommendation by the
faculty, was due to anti-union discrimination.9 9 The arbitrator noted that
the grievant had been an active anti-administration advocate and observed
that "vigorous union activity and pressure for goals of a union must
necessarily normally be anti-administration or anti-management."' 0 0 He
found that the grievant's union activities were "a significant source" of one of
the dean's reasons for refusing to appoint the grievant as department
chairman. Nevertheless, the arbitrator decided that the anti-union discrimination was not the sole and exclusive basis for the adverse decision and,
therefore, refused to sustain the charge.
This contrasts with an award in CUNY concerning, an allegation of a
violation of the nondiscrimination clause in the decision not to renew a
lecturer in the City College of New York.' 0 ' The grievant had been issued
a notice of nonreappointment which was subsequently rescinded with a
caution that his status would be reviewed carefully. An intensive series of
classroom observations by faculty members was initiated which departed in
some respects from the procedural evaluation requirements of the contract.
The grievant thereupon initiated an administrative appeal as provided for in
the grievance procedure, and the matter was ordered returned for procedural
compliance, following which the department's personnel committee reaf98. Ci. Mendez v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 285 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 1972). But see
New York Institute of Technology v. Council of Metropolitan & Old Westbury Chapters
AAUP, AAA Case No. 1330-1461-75 (Dec. 5, 1975) (Friedman, Arbitrator) (a faculty
member's failure to appear in time to commence the academic year was not tantamount
to a resignation and, thus, the dismissal procedure, requiring a faculty hearing, had to
apply). Arbitrator Friedman's opinion holds together a good deal better than the more
artificial reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
99. Board of the Junior College, Dist. .508, Chicago, Illinois v. AFT Cook County
Teachers Union, Local 1600, AAA Case No. 5130-044-68 (July 9, 1968) (Davis,
Arbitrator) [not currently on file].
100. Id. at 7.
101. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. United Fed'n of College
Teachers, AFL-CIO, Local 1460, AAA Case No. 1330-0282-70 (June 24, 1971) (Rubin,
Arbitrator) [not currently on file].
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firmed its earlier negative judgment. The grievant then pursued the matter
as a violation of the agreement's guarantee of non-discrimination for union
activity.
The grievant had been both an undergraduate and graduate student in the
department and was well-known to many professors, some on the appointments committee, but not to the new chairman who seemed ignorant of some
aspects of the grievant's career. In support of the department's judgment
the chairman testified to the meagerness of the grievant's output in the
discipline, 10 2 and memoranda from faculty observers were submitted to
establish inadequacies in the grievant's teaching. The arbitrator noted,
however, that the grievant's department had been undergoing change; the
selection of a new chairman coincided with a shift in the teaching direction
of the department and in curriculum changes affecting the employment of
faculty members holding lecturerships. The grievant served as chairman of
the union grievance committee on his campus and in that capacity was at the
center of charges of contract violation against his own department. Thus,
the arbitrator concluded that the grievant "became the focus of the turmoil
of the Department's changes, as the officer of the Union, as a Lecturer
vulnerable to curriculum changes and as [a member of the discipline]
evidently opposed to the teaching changes.' 0 3 These factors culminated in
a consensus among the members of the department that the grievant, "the
active unionist and gadfly,"' 1 4 was no longer wanted. The arbitrator
supported this conclusion by citing examples of anti-union bias on the part of
faculty members evaluating the grievant: one member admonished the
grievant that his union activity "actively interfered with his development" in
the discipline; another expressed the conviction that lecturers should not be
allowed to secure tenure (one of the union goals); and, the department
chairman criticized the role of the union in obstructing his plans for the
department and the grievant's part as a union spokesman. 105
The arbitrator took note of the difficulty of proving discrimination for
union activity. The determination "must by necessity be derived from the
balancing of the substantial evidence consisting of instances of both proper
and improper actions .... 106 There was an "interlacing of displeasure

' 07
with the grievant as an official of the Union and with him as a teacher."'
The academic department's consideration of the grievant was, he concluded,

"tainted by the Department's bias . . . stemming from disapproval of the

union and his activities.' 0 s
A critical difference exists between the above case and the standard
adopted by the arbitrator in the Chicago City College chairman case, in
102. The arbitrator held that the department's publication requirement was a matter

of academic judgment rather than improper age discrimination. He observed, however,
that in view of the grievant's "late realization of . . . training in the same college,
perhaps departmental expectation of disciplinary production should be more reflective of
individual situations of the faculty members." Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 22.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 25.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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which there also was an interlacing of permissible and impermissible considerations. In the City College of New York case the arbitrator did not
determine that union activity was the sine qua non for the decision; rather,
the award stated that anti-union bias "tainted" the decision. In the Chicago
case, however, there was a finding that the improper ground was not the sole
and exclusive basis for the decision.
Although there may be no reason to criticize the merits of the CUNY award
on the basis of all the evidence heard by the arbitrator, the institutional
implications of the adopted standard warrant attention. Faculty committees
and administrations may, under the CUNY approach, become more circumspect in their dealings with faculty union activists, and a natural caution may
deter firm judgments on the academic merits of borderline cases in order to
avoid the turmoil and expense of arbitration. As noted in the discussion of
the Schoolcraft reprimand case, academic freedom is understood to extend to
activities critical of institutional policies. Since collective bargaining will
have a critical bearing on educational policy, it follows that academic
freedom also protects those individual faculty members critical of the union's
activities in this regard. This protection encompasses a professor's right to
state publicly his opposition to union goals or methods affecting the administration of his own department, as in stating the view that a lectureship should
not be a tenure-bearing position. The arbitrator in the City College case did
not distinguish statements by the department chairman or senior colleagues
merely reflective of anti-union animus from expressions of opinion on
institutional policy subject to negotiation with the union.
Interestingly, the right of intramural speech and activity has been at least
partially recognized under the CUNY agreement in an award concerning the
failure to assign teaching duties to and the subsequent nonrenewal of another
lecturer. 10 9 The individual had been an active participant in a conflict with
the administration in one component of the City University and had been
involuntarily transferred from that unit to an academic department not in his
discipline at the City College of New York. The receiving department
declined to assign teaching duties to an individual who had not been selected
and approved by it. During this controversy the grievant and a number of
others petitioned the university's faculty senate for a hearing, alleging that
their terminations in the previous program were for reasons violative of their
academic freedom. The senate's hearing committee agreed. 110
The arbitrator, reciting the hearing committee's report in detail, found that
the grievant "was considered by members of the administration to be
'politically motivated' and that adverse action was taken .

basis.""'

.

. on that

Accordingly, he reasoned that the prohibition on non-discrimina-

109. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO v. Board of Higher
Educ. of the City of New York, AAA Case No. 1339-0893-70 (Nov. 30, 1971)
(Christensen, Arbitrator).
110. The circumstances of the conflict are discussed in Academic Freedom and
Tenure: City University of New York (SEEK Center), 60 AAUP BULL. 67 (1974).
111. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO v. Board of Higher
Educ. of the City of New York, AAA Case No. 13-39-0893-70, at 18 (Nov. 30, 1971)
(Christensen, Arbitrator).

1976]

FACULTY STATUS ARBITRATION

tion for "political belief" found in the agreement "fully comprehends internal
institutional politics as well as the broader areas. 11 2 He concluded that "it
was the political motivation and beliefs of the grievant as expressed in these
internal institutional conflicts which led to the complex of actions which left
him as a teacher with no one to teach."' 1 3
These CUNY awards suggest that although freedom of intra-institutional
expression may be contractually protected, utterances by senior faculty
members at variance with union goals or policies may be relied on by an
arbitrator in reversing a department's judgment affecting the status of a
militant unionist. The contractual guarantee may then be of limited value,
given the likelihood that senior faculty will refrain from open criticism if
their "protected" expressions may be put to such a use by the arbitrator.
Thus, even in an area where there is no dearth of arbitral experience,
determinations on the quantum and character of the evidence considered
4
may have serious implications for the conduct of academic government."1
(4)

A Reassessment.

Returning to the questions posed at the outset of this section, if the
arbitrator is to reach the merits of the academic decision (putting aside the
phrasing of arbitral standards), upon what assumptions does he proceed
and to what sources does he look as a guide to decision? On the former, two
rather fundamentally different arbitral approaches are reflected in the awards
15
surveyed. The first, best exemplified in the University of Bridgeport,"
7
6
Bryant College,"1 NYIT,11 and the later Southeastern Massachusetts
University"18 awards, proceeds on the industrial assumption of management's inherent right to make personnel decisions, equating management to
112. Id.
113. Id. at 16. A companion case concerned the nonrenewal of a fellow lecturer who
had also been transferred and was among the group dealt with by the senate's report.
Unlike the case under discussion, his department did assign teaching duties and reached a
negative evaluation, albeit with a procedural error which was remedied following an
administrative appeal. In the companion case, the arbitrator found the record devoid of
evidence that other than an academic judgment was involved, noting: "The fact that the
Grievant was engaged in a bitter dispute with one portion of the college administration
. . . does not make a prima facie case that a decision not to reappoint him by another
branch of that administration is automatically invalid." United Fed'n of College
Teachers, Local 1460, AFL-CIO v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York,
AAA Case No. 1339-0891-70, at 16 (Nov. 30, 1971) (Christensen, Arbitrator).
114. See also Wayne County Community College Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, Local
2000 v. Wayne County Community College Bd., AAA Case No. 5439-0471-71 (Nov. 12,
1971) (Ahearn, Arbitrator), in which the arbitrator concluded that although an honest
judgment had been formed concerning the faculty member, the department's reliance on
an unrepresentative sample of student opinion, some of which reflected racial bias (the
candidate was from the Near East), required remedy because the college may by that
reliance have "unwittingly discriminated" against the grievant on the basis of race. Id.
at 18.
115. University of Bridgeport v. AAUP, AAA Case No. 1239-0069-75 (Aug. 18,
1975) (Zack, Arbitrator).
116. Bryant Faculty Fed'n Local 1769, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bryant College of
Business Adm'n, AAA Case No. 1130-0405-71 (Oct. 11, 1972) (Fallon, Arbitrator).
117. New York Institute of Technology v. Council of Metropolitan and Old Westbury
Chapters AAUP, AAA Case No. 1330-0635-75 (March 18, 1976) (Knowlton, Arbitrator).
118. Board of Trustees, Southeastern Massachusetts Univ. v. SMU Faculty Fed'n,
Local 1895, AFT, AAA Case No. 1139-9528-70 (April 6, 19,71) (Zack, Arbitrator).

[Vol. 30

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

the administration or governing board. 119 While the collective agreement or
institutional policy incorporated by the agreement might subject those decisions to procedural or substantive limitations, these in turn are construed
narrowly or not closely examined as a seeming derogation from management
prerogative. What is not accommodated, perhaps for the want of industrial
analogies, is the system of faculty participation in the merits of personnel
decisions and the academic values underpinning that participation. As a
result, the fact of faculty participation is given little weight and the governance system is reduced to formalism. 120 Inevitably, faculty unions and
arbitrators themselves will press for more detailed contractual language. 12
119. This approach is also reflected in the following cases: Bryant College Faculty
Fed'n, Local 1769, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Bryant College of Business Adm'n, AAA Case
No. 1130-0313-75 (Oct. 17, 1975) (Teele, Arbitrator); Macomb County Community
College v. Macomb County Community College Faculty Org'n, AAA Case No. 54390849-74 (Feb. 6, 1975) (Herman, Arbitrator) (a contractual prohibition on disciplinary
suspensions without a prior hearing but allowing for withholding of salary "in the event
the matter has not been adjudicated by the end of the academic year" applicable solely to
short-term suspensions but not to a suspension without pay for an entire year);
University of Rhode Island AAUP v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case No.
1139-0678-73 (Feb. 26, 1974) (Fallon, Arbitrator); Senate Professional Ass'n v. New
York (State Univ. of New York at Binghamton), OER File No. PS-SU-BI-1 (Jan. 22,
1973) (Yagoda, Arbitrator).
120. See also Board of the Junior College, Dist. 508, Chicago, Ill. v. AFT Cook
County Teachers Union, Local 1600, AAA Case No. .5130-0044-68 (July 9, 1968)
(Davis, Arbitrator), where the arbitrator observed with respect to the reasons for the
administration's non-concurrence in the selection of the faculty's preferred candidate:
Some of these reasons may not have been considered valid by the department faculty or, possibly, even by an impartial observer. But, pursuant to
present contract provisions, it is the dean's opinion of qualifications that
counts. His qualitative judgment, be it emphasized, is not by contract subject to review by the faculty or by an impartial evaluator.
Id. at 7. However, other arbitrators have struck slightly different balances. See, e.g.,
Seattle Community College, Dist. VI, Seattle, Washington v. Seattle Community College
Fed'n of Teachers, AAA Case No. 7539-0025-71 (Nov. 29, 1971) (Peterschmidt,
Arbitrator) (where procedures requiring faculty recommendation of two candidates for
the department chairmanship, one of whom was appointed by the president, were
complied with and the arbitrator declined to review the merits of the complaint by the
dissatisfied candidate); Faculty Fed'n of Erie Community College v. Erie Community
College, AAA Case No. 14-39-0146-73 (Aug. 23, 1973) (Doherty, Arbitrator) (written
reasons must be provided by the administration for its refusal to select a faculty
recommended appointment only where it disfavored any of the faculty's nominees, not
where it selected a nominee approved but not preferred).
121. One of the arbitrators in CUNY has called for more explicit standards, noting
that "instructions which are ambiguous such as 'professional incompetence' or, particularly, 'academic judgment' are simply a temptation to give us more authority that [sic] we
probably should have." Christensen, Due Process and Academic Judgment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE

FIRST

ANNUAL

CONFERENCE,

NATIONAL

CENTER

FOR

THE

STUDY

OF

104, 107 (M. Benewitz ed. 1973). The
successor CUNY agreement clarified its limitation on arbitral authority which seems,
however, to do no more than codify what the arbitrators had concluded:
'[A]cademic judgment' shall mean the judgment of academic authorities
(including faculty, as defined by the Bylaws, and the Board) (1) as to the
procedures, criteria and information to be used in making determinations
as to appointment, reappointment, promotions, and tenure and (2) as to
whether to recommend or grant appointment, reappointment, promotions
and tenure to a particular individual on the basis of such procedures, criteria and information. In the arbitration of any grievance of action based
in whole or in part upon such academic judgment, the Arbitrator shall not
review the merits of the academic judgment or substitute his own judgment
therefor, provided that the Arbitrator may determine (i) that the action
violates a term of this Agreement, or (ii) that it is not in accordance with
the Bylaws or written policies of the Board, or (iii) that the claimed academic judgment in respect of the appointment, reappointment, promotion
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
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However, accretions of increasingly complex contractual regulation will perforce accelerate the "contract focus"' 122 and thus encourage an attitude of
"creeping" if not "galloping" legalism between faculty and administration. 123
The second line of cases, best exemplified in the Oakland University 124
and University of Rhode Island awards, 1 25 reflects a more sophisticated and
realistic approach.'12 These decisions recognize that the arbitrator is an
agent for an academic government not conducted by collective bargaining in
which decision-making responsibility is shared between faculty and administration. The arbitral role, substituting adjudication for political suasion, is to
assure the integrity of the governance system. Thus, the fact of a bargaining
relationship and considerations of labor policy, so persuasive in the "industrial" line of cases, are simply irrelevant to the disposition of these kinds of
12 7
disputes.
or tenure of a particular individual in fact constituted an arbitrary or discriminatory application of the Bylaws or written policies of the Board.
Agreement between the Professional Staff Congress/CUNY and the Board of Higher
Education of the City of New York § 20.5(b) (1973).
122. The "contract focus" is illustrated in one award in which the arbitrator, faced
with a request by the parties to an agreement for a "declaration of rights" defining the
permissible circumstances under which the contractual right of involuntary transfer of
faculty could be exercised, observed that "arbitrators (like water) cannot rise above the
source of their authority which is the 'agreement' of the parties as represented in their
signed documents or . . . by a clear pattern of mutual conduct." Board of Junior
College Dist. No. 508, County of Cook, and State of Illinois v. Cook County College
Teachers' Union, Local 1600, AFT, AFL-CIO, AAA Case No. 5130-0324-69 (June 5,
1970) (Seitz, Arbitrator) [not currently on file]. He expressed an understanding of the
reasons why the administration should feel a need for reserving a right of involuntary
transfer in the future. He also demonstrated an understanding of the faculty's interest in
protecting its academic freedom and defending itself from actions detrimental to its
economic or professional interests. "The answer," he stated, "lies in a careful balancing
of these two interests. The balancing can best be accomplished not by resort to vague
and general concepts not mutually accepted or to such theories as the sovereignty of
public bodies borrowed from theories of the nature of the State or the reserved rights
theory of labor-management relations, but by a careful examination of the Agreement."
Id. (emphasis added). The arbitrator declined to inform them what their agreement
meant. See also Pennsylvania v. Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties, 65 Lab. Arb. 910 (1975) (Glushien, Arbitrator) (declining to issue a
declaratory judgment in the absence of a contest on the merits); Lansing Community
College Chapter, MAHE v. Board of Trustees of Lansing Community College, AAA
Case No. 5439-228-71 (June 9, 1971) (Heilbrun, Arbitrator) (issuing a declaratory
judgment concerning the adoption of student evaluation procedures in the absence of
their application in any contested personnel decisions).
123. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, NOMOS XI, at 3 (1969). For
more on the dangers to academic values posed by the notion of "going by the book" see
R. CARR & D. VAN EYCK, supra note 1, at 224-25, 237-39, and Kadish, The Theory of
the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 AAUP BULL. 120 (1972).
124. Oakland Univ. Chapter AAUP v. Oakland Univ. (May 17, 1974) (Smith,
Arbitrator).
125. University of Rhode Island, AAUP v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case
No. 1139-0161-73 (Oct. 8, 1974) (Stutz, Arbitrator); University of Rhode Island,
AAUP v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, AAA Case No. 1139-0070-74 (Sept. 4, 1974)
(Stutz, Arbitrator); American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Board of Regents (R.I.),
AAA Case No. 1139-0798-73 (Aug. 16, 1974) (MacLeod, Arbitrator).
126. This approach is also reflected in the following cases: Y.I. v. University of
Hawaii (Feb. 10, 1976) (Conklin, Arbitrator); Professor N. v. Northeastern Univ. (July
21, 1975) (Kennedy, Arbitrator); Onondaga Community College Fed'n of Teachers,
Local 1845 v. Onondaga Community College, AAA Case No. 15-37-0151-73 (Sept. 14,
1973) (Dennis, Arbitrator).
127. For example, Northeastern University has pursuant to a recommendation of its
Faculty Senate adopted a grievance-arbitration procedure for faculty status disputes. A
grievance is defined as an allegation of discrimination due to age, sex, race, religion,
national origin, or marital status, a violation of academic freedom, a dismissal "without
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The difference in these approaches is reflected as well in the sources
looked to for decision. The "industrial" line of cases relies most heavily on
the fact of a bargaining relationship and tends to ignore the larger goals of
maintaining a system of academic government resting heavily on faculty
participation. While some results may be more arguable than others, given
the vagaries of contract language, the University of Bridgeport, NYIT, and
Bryant College awards seem almost dogged in this regard. Moreover, in the
academic freedom cases at Schoolcraft College and St. John's University the
awards do not look at all to academic norms or practice, a curious omission
in a system which theoretically takes account of the "common law of the
shop." One explanation may be that the "common law" is thought of as
being supplied in arbitration awards themselves; thus the absence of any
significant arbitral experience has thrown these arbitrators largely on their
own resources and back to industrial assumptions.
On the other hand the University of Rhode Island and Oakland University awards place great weight on the institutional demands of the governance
system, and the first Southeastern Massachusetts University award, 28 as well
as others, 129 rely heavily on the significance of academic practice as
indispensable to arbitral disposition. This underlines the close relationship
between the arbitral function and the personal qualifications of the arbitrator; if the arbitral standards delegate academic decision-making authority,
then sensitivity to the academic milieu is a requirement for a workable
system. 130 The impact of arbitral value judgments on academic processes is
underlined as well in the fashioning of an appropriate remedy.
just cause," a denial of "due process" in consideration for tenure, promotion, or
reappointment, a misinterpretation or inequitable application of institutional policy, or
unfair or inequitable treatment. Final Report of the Northeastern University Faculty
Senate on Grievance Procedures § 6-01 (April 25, 1973). In essence, this out-ofcollective bargaining grievance-arbitration procedure is indistinguishable from what a
collective agreement would provide.
A most curious variation is found in the grievance procedure established without
collective bargaining by Executive Order 201 of the Chancellor for the California State
University and College System (July 10, 1974). Under this procedure a faculty
grievance committee or, at the grievant's option, a hearing officer decides whether
there was a substantial procedural departure, whether favorable evidence was ignored,
or whether "no reasonable, unbiased person faced with the same facts could have taken
the action" complained of. The resulting report is advisory to the campus president and
if he fails to accept the recommendation, arbitration is available to determine whether
the president's rejection of the report was arbitrary. This rather convoluted two-stage
procedure has been characterized as "ponderously inefficient" by a close observer of the
academic scene. Peairs, For Further Information, in R. PEAmS, supra note 12, at 85, 87.
128. SMU Faculty Fed'n Chapter 1895, AFT v. Board of Trustees, SMU, AAA Case
No. 1139-0490-70 (March 10, 1971) (Kennedy, Arbitrator) [not currently on file].
129. See, e.g., The first award under the Northeastern University procedures, defining
"due process" essentially in academic terms, Professor N. v. Northwestern Univ. (July 21,
1975) (Kennedy, Arbitrator).
130. Rather little has been done by way of close scrutiny of arbitral awards.
Compare Gross, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 21 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV.5.5 (1967), with Seitz, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators,
21 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 427 (1968). See also Alexander, Reflections on Decision
Making, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TiE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

1 (R. Kahn

ed. 1962); Getman, The Debate over the Caliber of Arbitrators: Judge Hays and His
Critics, 44 IND. L.J. 182 (1969).
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C. Remedies
Where a substantive contractual guarantee, such as non-discrimination,
has been breached, reinstatement has been afforded. A more difficult

remedial issue is posed when the evaluation procedures have been misapplied or not followed.

In one case the collective agreement provided that

the "views" of the academic department be communicated to the administration. The arbitrator, therefore, concluded that more than a tally of the
department's secret ballot vote was required.' 3 ' Accordingly, he ordered
the grievant reinstated. The case is colored somewhat by the fact that false
information was circulated to the department just prior to its vote and to
which the grievant was unable to respond. Thus, the "due process"
attendant to the departmental consideration was held to be violated. 1 32 The

arbitrator could have ordered a reconsideration without reinstatement, inasmuch as the initial consideration arguably would not have produced a
different result even had the deleterious information not been circulated and
had the department drafted a written statement of its views rather than
obtaining a simple majority vote. The remedy imposes a sanction on the
institution for procedural error in order to insure more careful procedural
1 33
compliance in the future.

The CUNY approach, however, forecloses this or similar results by
limiting the arbitrator's authority in instances of procedural error to remand

for procedural compliance. That distinction has not proved altogether
satisfactory. In a close case an instructor in Brooklyn College of the City
University was denied reappointment which would have resulted in the

acquisition of tenure. 134 The decision was made by the department without

131. Board of Junior College Dist. 508, AAA Case No. 5130-0165-69, 53 Lab. Arb.
530 (Aug. 19, 1969) (Sembower, Arbitrator).
132. The administration argued that it should not be held responsible for errors
committed by the faculty of an academic department, i.e., that the matter was an intraunit dispute. The arbitrator described the faculty's role as a "hard-won prerogative" for
which the governing board "in the role of management, undoubtedly has little enthusiasm." He held that the board nevertheless "has the clear responsibility to refuse to
follow any procedure which it knows will deny 'due process' or is otherwise invalid." Id.
at 535.
133. See Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1220
(1962). In Wayne County Community College Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, Local 2000 v.
Wayne County Community College Bd. of Trustees, AAA Case No. 5439-0471-71 (Nov.
12, 1971) (Ahearn, Arbitrator), the arbitrator awarded reinstatement because reliance
on a possibly unrepresentative and biased sample of student opinion "did not afford the
grievance (sic) due process contemplated in the Agreement and therefore acted arbitrarily in terminating his employment." Id. at 22. He did not award back pay since the
administration "established grounds ... which would have been sufficient to sustain the
termination of a probationary employee but for its denial of due process .... ." Id.
Similarly, in Oakland Community College v. Oakland Community College Faculty Ass'n,
58 Lab. Arb. 316 (1972) (McCormick, Arbitrator), where the arbitrator adopted a "just
cause" standard in reviewing what was essentially a late notice of nonrenewal, he ordered
reinstatement and tenure but not back pay. "This award will preserve grievant's future
in the academic profession, relief which justice requires, but will effectively serve as
notice that he cannot freely resume his former class attendance pattern without risking
future sanctions by the College." Id. at 319. See also Jackson Community College v.
Jackson Faculty Ass'n (Dec. 20, 1974) (Roumell, Arbitrator) (holding the failure to
consult with the grievant about course scheduling was error and awarding him a choice
of future rescheduling even though it was not at all certain that the earlier required
consultations would have given him the schedule he preferred).
134. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. Legislative Conference, AAA
Case No. 1339-0706-70 (Dec. 1, 1970) (Roberts, Arbitrator) [not currently on file].
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substantial compliance with the contract's evaluation procedure which required an explicit number of classroom observations and evaluations. Her
department's personnel committee reversed its original negative recommendation in view of the error in procedure, but noted that it adhered to its
original position on the merits. The college personnel and budget committee
reconsidered the matter and confirmed its prior negative judgment.
The arbitrator observed that the university was under an obligation to
insure that the employee received the required observations and evaluations
so that the departmental and college committees could render an "academic
judgment" on the basis of a whole record. Accordingly, he found a gross
failure to follow established procedure without reason and thus faced the
issue of whether he had the authority to order the grievant reappointed in
order to effectuate "compliance with established procedure."' 3 5
Inasmuch as a reappointment would confer tenure, the administration
argued such an order would have the effect of substituting the arbitrator's
judgment for the "academic judgment" of the appropriate faculty and
administrative bodies, a result prohibited in the Nota Bene. The arbitrator
reasoned, however, that remand without reappointment would be meaningless; it would not provide redress "for the arbitrary denial of her procedural
rights that clearly are substantive.' 136 "This conclusion," the arbitrator
observed, "was reached after much agonizing over the consequences of this
award and its impact on the University's committee system that jealously
guards its standard of excellence in the grant of tenure.' 1 3 7 To accede to
the university's position would result, he concluded, in providing "no antidote
to the wronged and to liberate the wrongdoer.' 3 8 The university still had
available a proceeding to terminate for cause which, while placing a far
greater burden on the administration, is, he observed, "of the University's
l39
own doing.'
Similarly, the arbitrator in the Queensborough "coerced" academic judgment case also had to confront the remedial problem.1 40 He observed that
he lacked authority under the Nota Bene to order reinstatement in a case
involving an arbitrary use of procedure. On the other hand, he noted that in
remanding for procedural compliance he did have authority to determine
what procedures must be complied with in order to conform to the agreement. He noted also that a remand for reconsideration prior to the
contractual date for notice of nonrenewal can result in a timely corrective
review. A reconsideration after that date, however, would be ineffective
inasmuch as the board was required to award tenure if the notice date had
135. Id. at 20.
136. Id. at 20-21.
137. id. at 22.
138. Id.

139. Id. The appellate division later denied enforcement of the award by a 3-2 vote

on the theory that the order exceeded the arbitrator's authority. Legislative Conf. of the
City Univ. of New York v. Board of Higher Educ., 38 App. Div. 2d 478, 330 N.Y.S.2d
688 (1972). The court of appeals affirmed, 31 N.Y.2d 926, 293 N.E.2d 93, 340
N.Y.S.2d 924 (1972) (per curiam), accepting the administration's offer of an additional
probationary year during which a procedurally sound evaluation would be made.
140. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York v. Legislative Conference, AAA
Case No. 1,330-0090-71 (Jan. 25, 1972) (Friedman, Arbitrator).
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passed and valid notice of nonrenewal had not been given. Accordingly,
without awarding reinstatement (and tenure) the arbitrator ordered reinstatement of the earlier (valid) affirmative recommendation for tenure, the
inclusion of the grievant's name in the chancellor recommended list to the
governing board nunc pro tunc, rescission of the invalid letter of nonrenewal,
and "recognition" that valid notice of nonrenewal was not provided. Thus,
by operation of law and not by arbitral action, according to the arbitrator's
reasoning, the grievant had achieved tenure indirectly where the arbitrator
was seemingly prohibited from accomplishing it directly.
These cases stand in sharp contrast to the conclusion in a case concerning
141
the failure to promote a counselor in a community college in Michigan.
The contract set criteria for promotion, provided for the submission of a
self-evaluation and an evaluation conference, and required the provision of
reasons should promotion be denied. The grievant was not recommended
for promotion, and after raising both substantive and procedural issues was
re-evaluated and affirmatively recommended. The college administration
had, however, placed a limitation on the number of promotions to be
awarded and accepted the first four names on the list submitted for that
department, rejecting -the last three, one of which was the grievant's.
The arbitrator found that the grievant's superior had no more information
at the time of the second evaluation than before, and concluded that the
superior had apparently simply changed his mind. While the arbitrator
agreed with the college that a recommendation based on evaluation is
basically subjective, he found that where criteria are not actually considered
the propriety of the judgment is called in question. He concluded that the
grievant's superior failed to conduct the evaluation properly and should have
made a favorable recommendation in the first instance. The arbitrator
declined, however, to award damages or the promotion because of the
uncertainty in light of the board's limitation on the number of promotions
that had the grievant been recommended initially she would in fact have
been promoted. However, in the second Onondaga Community College
case the arbitrator failed to "detect a rational basis to support the trustees'
selection for promotion" of fourteen of thirty-five candidates recommended
to it by a faculty committee. Thus, he ordered all those above the lowest
rated by the faculty and approved by the trustees 142 to be promoted.
In sum, differing arbitral attitudes are reflected in the willingness to
fashion remedies. The speculative character of "what would have happened"
which was so persuasive to the arbitrator in the Michigan case seems in
the other awards to be outweighed by the impact of the decision on future
conduct. Equally speculative in the Brooklyn College case was the question
of whether tenure would have been confirmed had the university adhered to
the procedure. The arbitrator was persuaded by the failure to apprise the
141. Macomb County Community College Faculty Org'n v. Macomb County Community College, AAA Case No. 5439-0139-70 (Nov. 10, 1970) (Casselman, Arbitrator).
142. Onondaga Community College Fed'n of Teachers Local 1845 v. Onondaga
Community College, AAA Case No. 15-37-0151-73 (Sept. 14, 1973) (Dennis, Arbitrator).
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grievant through the evaluation procedure of her weaknesses or of other
criticism. This assumes that the absence of such counseling disadvantaged
the grievant in competing for tenure, a result which could not be remedied
merely by a pro forma but procedurally correct evaluation on remand. In
view of the limitation on arbitral authority in the CUNY agreement the
arbitrator's identification of the evaluation procedure as a substantive right in
order to award a reinstatement for breach is noteworthy. Interestingly,
while the arbitrator in the Michigan case was apparently willing to hear
evidence not produced by the faculty organization, that objective criteria
would establish that the grievant's promotion would have been granted, the
arbitrator in the Brooklyn College case precluded a consideration of testimony
concerning the grievant's academic competence, training, and experience due
precisely to the limitation on the scope of his jurisdiction contained in the
Nota Bene.
Indeed, given the prior actions of the chancellor and CUNY committee in
the Queensborough case, the most reasonable assumption is that the board
would have rejected all or many of the president's recommendations had he
not reduced them. The award of tenure albeit indirectly in that case seems
clearly intended to have a prophylactic effect. On the other hand, the
failure to reinstate or award damages in the St. John's case freed the
administration to violate its own rules governing suspension and dismissal for
reasons violative of academic freedom (which the procedural requirements
were designed to protect) so long as such suspension was with pay.
IV.

SOME THOUGHTS ON ACCOMMODATING ARBITRATION
TO HIGHER EDUCATION

This study of faculty status arbitration has revealed a variety of arbitral
approaches and results dealing with similar problems and often under similar
contractual provisions. To be sure, these awards reflect arbitration's earliest
encounter with higher education. Greater experience may yield a clearer
picture of the effects of alternative approaches and suggest other possibilities.
As the parties to collective agreements and the arbitrators become more
experienced, a more coherent body of arbitral doctrine may emerge. 148 In
anticipation of that development, however, the shape of such a system may be
discerned. A fuller articulation necessitates a separate discussion of arbitral
standards and arbitral selection and education.
Arbitral Standards. Given the untenability of the procedure-substance
dichotomy or the "academic judgment" exemption, arbitral standards will
have to allow unapologetically for consideration of the merits of faculty
status decisions; this in turn should lessen the pressure for procedural
over-elaboration. A significant problem is whether standards can be fashioned so as to avoid de novo arbitral judgments which the arbitration process
is ill-suited to make.14 4 The better approach is to view the arbitrator's role
143. J. Weisberger, supra note 4, at 42.

144. One could, for example, devise an hypothetical "arbitration" system in which a
panel of leading scholars in a faculty member's discipline is selected jointly by the
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as analogous to that of a court on review of administrative agency action; he
is not to make his own determination of the grievant's competence, qualifications, or conduct, but is to decide whether the decision-makers stayed within
the bounds contemplated by the collective agreement and other governing
instruments. Thus, the arbitrator should have authority to determine whether the challenged decision was substantially affected by a procedural error
(including departures from institutional governance policies), was based
significantly on proscribed considerations (e.g., violation of academic freedom), or was otherwise arbitrary or an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the
decision was 'one which on the basis of the information before them
academics in the position of the decision makers could reasonably have
made. In order to make an informed decision, the arbitrator should be
expected to draw heavily on academic custom, practice, and usage.
The proposed arbitral standards are no doubt subject to the criticism
which any arbitration system would confront: they inject the arbitrator into
the substance of academic decision-making. Further, the availability of
review dampens the ability of the faculty or administration to make negative
decisions in difficult or borderline cases. Nevertheless, if arbitration is
adopted some candid consideration of the merits is unavoidable for the
grievance procedure to be successful. Moreover, the substitution of adjudication for internal political suasion perforce substitutes an appeal to legalism
for the more flexible appeal to a sense of community values. The question
is whether, in an era where appeal to such values may have a lessened
impact on many campuses, a system of adjudication can be fashioned which
builds
on the institution's governance system and the reasons in support of
it. 145 This review of the arbitral experience suggests that the proposed
standard, coupled with great care in arbitral selection and education, has the
greatest potential for adapting successfully to the academic milieu. Furthermore, the system of governance would be buttressed, and the pressure on the
arbitrator to substitute his judgment de novo is lessened, by joining to the
proposed standard a heavy presumption in favor of the soundness of peer
judgment, i.e., the very foundation upon which the system of faculty
faculty and administration. The panel would hear from faculty, students, and administration concerning teaching and research ability, projected usefulness to the program,
ability to work well in the institution, and the like. It would assess the candidate's
published work, interview him on projected research, and issue a decision on reappointment, promotion, or tenure. It is the personal competence of the panel members,
however, and not the process which gives the result legitimacy. Indeed the adjudicatory
format is particularly ill-suited for this kind of decision. Moreover, it should be noted
that the hypothetical panel would function much like the peer review process.
145. It should be stressed again that there is a broad spectrum of types of institution.
As a leading study reported:
Particularly relevant . . . is the fact that faculty power and professional
independence vary with the quality of the school. The higher its academic standing, the more the institution resembles a professional guild;
further down the hierarchy, colleges take on the characteristics of regular
bureaucratic structures, with the 'higher-ups' in charge.
E. LADD & S. LIPSET, PROFESSORS, UNIONS, AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 98
(1973). Accordingly, the proposals advanced here have little relevance for either elite
universities or "public school" minded colleges. These proposals are relevant for the vast
middle range of institutions which espouse, or aspire to maintain, an academic government but lack the Gemeinschaft characteristic of the mature university.
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participation is based. Thus, the grievant would have to show, assuming
procedural compliance and the absence of improper considerations, that no
reasonable group of academics could have arrived at the judgment challenged given the data and criteria at hand. The presumption should carry
over where the grievant challenges administrative reversal of an affirmative
faculty recommendation. Here the burden would rest on the administration
146
to show compelling reasons for and the facts underpinning its decision.

Finally, the arbitrator must have broad remedial power for the system to be
effective.
Arbitral Selection and Education. While arbitral standards clearly affect the
outcome, this study suggests that the outcome is considerably affected by the
competence of the arbitrator and the assumptions he brings to bear in the
disposition of the case. Thus, it has been proposed that one means of
joining arbitration with academic government lies in the "careful choice of
arbitrators, to make certain they are aware of and sensitive to the value of
academic freedom, and are knowledgeable and understanding of the ways of
the academic world."'1 47 Yet, apart from some experimentation in the
1 48
CUNY and SUNY systems with standing panels under a single contract,
arbitral selection remains a largely ad hoc affair.
One device to obtain more knowledgeable arbitrators is to provide for a
tripartite panel consisting of faculty, administration, and a neutral.1 49 Such a
146. Allowing review on these grounds requires a full explanation in the arbitration
of the procedures, criteria, and data utilized by the faculty in arriving at its decision.
However, an arbitrator in one CUNY case held that a policy against the disclosure of the
discussions in personnel committees prevented him from ordering a member to testify to
those discussions in an arbitration concerning an allegation of sex discrimination.
Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York (City Univ.) v. Legislative Conference,
AAA Case No. 1339-1278-72 (Aug. 21, 1973) (procedural ruling), (Oct. 16, 1973)
(grievance denied) (Friedman, Arbitrator), award confirmed, Professional Staff Congress v. Board of Higher Educ., 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). The arbitrator
reasoned that the nondisclosure policy was incorporated into the agreement which the
grievance procedure itself would be available to enforce. Moreover, he clearly was
troubled by the inhibiting effect that the possibility of such disclosure might have on free
debate within collegial bodies. The award is subject to criticism on both grounds. First,
institutional policies are incorporated into the collective agreement only insofar as they
are not altered by the agreement; the arbitral reasoning is essentially circular. Second,
the conclusion is inconsistent with the anti-discrimination provision which, it was noted,
was held to withstand attack on "academic judgment" grounds. Thus, it may have the
practical effect of foreclosing a challenge based on discrimination by the peer group.
Finally, the provision in an arbitration of a full statement of the debate on the
individual is clearly distinguishable from improper disclosure in a social setting or from
the disclosure of materials secured under a promise of confidentiality, for example,
letters from referrants outside the institution. The institutional policy in question seems
directed simply to the first situation; the latter can be dealt with by in camera inspection
by the arbitrator. In sum, the implied promise of confidentiality of the debate should not
extend to prevent the disclosure in a contested case. Curiously, in a later case
concerning whether a negative tenure recommendation by a faculty committee was
improperly tainted by the administration's efforts to impose a tenure quota, see cases
accompanying notes 30-32 supra, the arbitrator did entertain, apparently without objection, evidence bearing on the committee's deliberations. Professional Staff Congress/
City Univ. of New York v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York, AAA Case
No. 1339-0332-74 (Oct. 26, 1974) (Stein, Arbitrator).
147. Sands, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 150, 172.
148. This is discussed more fully in J.Weisberger, supra note 4, at 38.
149. See, e.g., Agreement between Wayne State Univ. and the Wayne State Univ.
Chapter (AAUP), art. XVII (May 11, 1973); Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the Univ. of Delaware and the Univ. of Delaware Chapter, AAUP, art. XV (1973).
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structure presumes that the arbitrator will be educated to the nuances of the
case not only in its presentation but by debate within the committee as well.
Another alternative is to submit faculty status disputes for final determination to a purely internal faculty-administration agency, as a few agreements
do in instances of dispute between the administration and the peer group. 150
While this device has considerable advantages in assuring an informed "in
house" decision, the very proximity of the participants to the disputants may
affect the degree of objectivity expected to be brought to bear in governance
controversies; in that sense it is partly adjudicative and partly political, which
makes for an interesting mixture of arbitration and traditional institutional
processes.
To the extent that arbitrators will continue to be selected on an ad hoc
basis, the academic community would be well served if the leading organization of administration and faculty nominated standing panels of arbitrators
widely experienced in academic affairs for geographic areas where collective
bargaining seems particularly prevalent. Indeed, these arbitrators could be
used to resolve faculty status disputes wholly outside the context of collective
bargaining, either by ad hoc agreement in particular cases or by institutional
regulatory provisions as a substitute for litigation. While a corps of able and
academically experienced arbitrators may evolve by a process of natural
selection, 151 there is considerable utility in hastening its development.
A second aspect of arbitral education lies in the extent to which reliance is
placed on arbitration awards and other sources as representing a body of
applicable doctrine or authority.' 52 One means of reducing the ad hoc
character of arbitral judgments is to assure that most faculty status arbitration awards are published by a central agency, conceivably the consortium
of faculty and administration organizations suggested above. This would
facilitate empirical research in the actual impact of various arbitral approaches or results as well as analysis and criticism of a textual nature. Moreover, the proposed arbitral standard is intended to minimize the pressure
toward ever-expanding contractual elaboration. This in turn implies that
the refinement of the standard will be supplied by a body of arbitral case
law. It follows that the academic community would be benefited by assuring
the widespread availability of arbitration awards. In addition, the proposed
consortium could itself commission further investigations and sponsor other
programs for academic arbitrators (and their clients) in conjunction, perhaps,
with its listing procedure. Thus, without establishing a national judiciary
for higher education disputes, as some have suggested, 58 the adoption of
uniform arbitral standards and the creation of an agency exercising a degree
150. See, e.g., Agreement between Hofstra Univ. and Hofstra Univ. Chapter, AAUP,
arts. III, V, VI (Jan. 11, 1974); Agreement between Temple Univ. and AAUP, arts. VI,
VII, XIV (effective July 1973).
151. See J. Weisberger, supra note 4, at 38.
152. To some extent this may be a function of the amount of time counsel can spend
in the preparation of the case and the kind of material submitted to the arbitrator to
place the dispute in context. Curiously, the relative swiftness and informality of an
arbitration and "contract focus" of the proceeding may not be an advantage.
153. See Hobbs, An Academic Dispute-Settlement Commission: A Proposal, 52
EDUC. REcoRD, Spring 1971, at 181, proposing an ad hoc arbitration board be established
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of oversight in arbitral selection and work product may reduce the likelihood that widely shared principles of academic freedom and faculty governance will become eroded in the Balkanized world of collective agreement and
54
ad hoc arbitration.1

by legislation as an all-purpose dispute resolver in higher education, not merely for
faculty status issues. See also R. O'NEIL, THE COURTS, GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER
EDUCATION 39 (1972) (proposing a court for academic disputes).
154. An award issued after this Article had been sent to the printer reinforces the
conclusions drawn in the text. In it, Arbitrator Archibald Cox was called on to decide
the permissibility of a policy adopted by the University of Bridgeport which attempted
to limit, due to financial conditions, all new appointees to one-year, special and thus
non- "tenure track" appointments. American Association of University Professors (University of Bridgeport Chapter) v. University of Bridgeport, AAA Case No. 1239-0162-75
(May 3, 1976) (Cox, Arbitrator). The collective agreement contained a management
rights clause. However, it also incorporated AAUP standards governing probation and
tenure. Arbitrator Cox held that to the extent the policy attempted to exempt new appointments from the applicable probationary period it fell afoul of the incorporated
standards, i.e., the university could not unilaterally create a new category of faculty
appointment which would never be tenure eligible no matter how long the individual
was kept on. Thus far the award evidences that an able and academically knowledgeable
arbitrator given contractual standards incorporating widely shared norms of academic
practice will achieve a result fully in keeping with the character of the enterprise. However, the award goes on to observe that, "Nothing in the collective bargaining agreement can fairly be read to preclude warning a new non-tenured teacher that he or she
must realize that the appointment does not carry even the ordinary non-contractual expectation that good performance will lead to renewal." Id. at 3. While chastising the
parties for their failure to have worked out an agreeable settlement, Arbitrator Cox
suggests that the faculty would have acquiesced to the issuance of a "blunt warning"
to "each new appointee. . . that he would not have even the customary hope of renewal
upon good performance." id. at 5. Thus, in dictum the arbitrator would seem to
permit the institution, as an exercise of its management prerogative without faculty
consultation of any kind, to limit all new appointments to a special, temporary or visiting category without encountering any difficulty under the collective agreement or the
academic norms incorporated by it. To that extent it is more akin to the "industrial"
line of cases. Indeed the arbitrator consistently views the dispute as a practical one
which could and should have been solved pragmatically without raising questions of
principle. This is, of course, consistent with the notion of an arbitrator as a labor relations physician. In that sense, then, an able judge, performing a public function, removed
from any personal responsibilities to the parties, and perforce concerned with binding
principle may be in a rather different position in deciding hard cases. See, e.g., American Association of University Professors (Bloomfield College Chapter) v. Bloomfield
College, 322 A.2d 846 (N.J. Super. 1974). This suggests that to the extent overarching
principles are considered important the academic community will have to devise some
means beyond the language of the contract and the selection of able arbitrators for
assuring fidelity to them.

